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ABSTRACT 
 
Literature and Education: Recalling Matthew Arnold 
 
Martha Moore Crowley 
 
In a democracy, every individual is thought to have the potential to achieve what 
Matthew Arnold considers the supreme characteristic of intellectual freedom, “the intellectual 
maturity of man himself; the tendency to observe facts with a critical spirit; to search for their 
law, not to wander among them at random; to judge by the rule of reason, not by the impulse of 
prejudice or caprice” (The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, Vol. 1, p. 21).   But 
Arnold finds a critical opposition between man’s instinctive efforts to develop “fully and freely” 
and the economic forces of the industrial culture of modern democracies, consumed with work 
and wealth accumulation. He maintains that in the aesthetic experience of literature we behold 
the being we are capable of.   
First in his poetry, and later in his critical prose, Arnold confronts the malaise of 
modernity and the spiritual fragmentation at the heart of contemporary literature. The hope for 
his project for education is that it can free us to find new critical consciousness and recover the 
moral authority of aesthetic judgment. In this study I try to explicate Arnold’s conviction that 
collapsing the duality of literature and science expands our knowledge of the world and that 
cultivating humanity through the experience of ideas in literature affirms the integrity of the 
individual and reconciles his or her relation to nature and the human community.  
The aim of this work is twofold. First it recasts Arnold’s uncertain legacy among 
philosophers of education in the perspective of philosophy as a way of life.  I hope it also invites 
further inquiry into his synthesis of intellect and imagination in the aesthetic phenomenon and its 
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Students of Matthew Arnold tend to compartmentalize his life and his work and in 
so doing stand to miss an intertextuality that finds common ground in Arnold’s aesthetic 
ideals. His poetic sensibilities sought some embodiment in logic that would inform us how 
we are to live. His poetic ideals aimed to reveal things as they really are. An underlying 
assumption of the value of the aesthetic to the human condition connects the wide-ranging 
topics of his prose including literary and cultural criticism, education, religion, politics, 
and literary criticism.  Arnold’s work expresses the lived experience he deeply felt in an 
age of transition at the twilight of the Romantic and the dawn of the modern era. He was 
the orphan of one and would become a prophet of the other.  But there is little clear 
consensus on his work, which found expression first in poetic images then critical prose. 
As Linda Ray Pratt points out, he exemplifies the uncertain role of the modern artist and 
the authority of the modern critic (2000, p. 1). As it now comes into clearer focus I find 
Arnold’s work at a crossroad in aesthetic theory which shifts the artistic objective towards 
critical consciousness and moral authority.    
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Arnold offers an interpretative key to his outlook in a letter written to his mother in 
1869. “My poems represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind of the last quarter 
century, and thus they will probably have their day as people become conscious to 
themselves of what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions 
which reflect it” (Lang, (1998), p. 347). The quarter century to which Arnold refers is 
identified by a radical shift in man’s orientation to the world, which gives definition to 
modernity and modern literary production. Arnold breaks with the Victorian tradition, 
which held an objective sense of nature and landscape as something to reflect upon, and 
examine for evidence of transcendent truth.  He shares the Romantic conviction that behind 
the objective phenomenon known to the senses there are truths that can be known 
imaginatively by eliminating the distinction between the subjective observer and the 
observed object (Roper, 1969). But in Arnolds’s view the dawn of the modern bears 
distinctly barren and unpoetic truths.  
Over and beyond tracings of symbolic landscapes the poet observes his heroes 
alone on a “darkling plain” and the reality of nature haunting. 
Yet, through the hum of torrent lone, 
And brooding mountain-bee,  
There sobs I know not what ground-tone 
Of human agony (Arnold, “Obermann,” 1909, p. 175) 
As poet, he looks beyond the visionary surface of nature and confronts an absent beauty. 
He suffers, along with modern consciousness, disillusionment, alienation, ennui, and an 
awareness of the self, alone in a world without order and without the ability to escape. 
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With the authority of metaphysical convictions succumbing to advances in scientific theory 
and the idea of an eternal or absolute in dissolution, he stares into an abyss. Thus Arnold 
poured himself into cultural and literary criticism.  In that genre the central theme and 
motivating impulse, cultivating sustaining, moral consciousness emerges.  
Arnold would say that the men of his age had fallen victim to the “tendency to 
cultivate strictness of conscience” which favors man’s intellect at the expense of the 
integrated whole of human nature. Restoration of fullness of man’s instinctual powers 
would require “spontaneity of consciousness” for which the ancient Greeks are his most 
illustrative models. Individuals in modernity would need intellectual deliverance to restore 
a moral balance and recover a critical spirit of inquiry and a free play of the mind. Thus he 
calls for the mediating power of culture through an aesthetic education.  
The eighteenth century moralist, Friedrich Schiller, had an enormous influence on 
Arnold’s thinking. Hohr’s (2002) keen analysis of Schiller’s humanist’s claims elucidates 
four authoritative registers in aesthetic experience which foreground what my analysis will 
reveal of Arnold’s faith in “culture” to reconcile human freedom with the material world:  
1. Illusion is the integrating medium of the individual, in the broadest sense the basis of 
morality. It provides the experience of purpose and meaning in life. 
2. It initiates moral thought in the individual and becomes the foundation of moral 
authority in the life of society and of the individual. 
3. Illusion is an experience of the world in its own right and as such is irreducible; thus it is 
subject to truth conditions as much as any other mode of experience. 
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4. Illusion is a medium of the criticism of reality. As the caretaker of desire and longing it 
has a utopian function. 
Arnold uses culture and also semblance in the same way that Schiller uses “the beautiful 
illusion” for the medium of art.  He stands on Schiller’s shoulders when he declares 
“poetry as criticism of life.” In the following chapters I hope to make evident a cohesive 
philosophy of education that grows out of this dictum.   
While Arnold scholars have tried to find some unified vision to connect his 
thoughts and the various genres in which he worked, tensions inherent in the poet’s life, in 
his poetry and his prose produced “fragments” which eschew an easily deciphered 
coherence. He wrote with prophetic insights for his time but with a sense that he would 
find a more attuned audience in the future. Thus, his work and reputation are alternately 
applauded and criticized, often misunderstood. There seem to be as many critics as 
apologists. But the twentieth century work of Arnoldian scholars, starting with that of the 
Columbia University Professor of Literature, Lionel Trilling, introduced some unity to his 
work and generated interest in continued scholarship.   
Trilling (1939) draws out important implications of Arnold’s thinking on matters 
germane to the present study, including the implications for a secular age inherent in the 
connections between his poetic ideals and the ancients’. He draws attention to the many 
syntheses of Arnold’s vision. And he lays the groundwork for continuing scholarship on 
Arnold’s view of the relation between the nature of sensuous and aesthetic perception and 
how they are bound up with the nature of the scientist and that of the artist.  It grounds 
current thinking on how art and imagination stand in relation to culture and conduct and 
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the veering of the modern mind towards relativistic and nihilistic directions. Importantly, 
he explicates Arnold’s conception of activism that runs though his critical prose.  
In addition to the influences of the shifting currents of the literary and political 
thought in his time, Arnold’s work also reflects the profound effects that modern 
philosophical developments had on his thinking.  We can trace Arnold’s sympathy with the 
German secular tradition of self-development or Bildung and its origins in Goethean 
idealism.  His inquiry into the moral value of ideas through “imaginative reason” can be 
seen to extend the theories of the tradition on culture and the imagination and the 
construction of consciousness.  Trilling compares Arnold’s connection of moral and 
aesthetic judgment to Hegel’s, “not in the old way of making morality the criterion of the 
aesthetic: on the contrary, he made the aesthetic the criterion of the moral” (1955, p. xii).  
In 1983 Park Honan published the definitive biography of Matthew Arnold. 
Insights developed from a large amount of unpublished material infuse a close reading of 
Arnold’s oeuvre to render a uniquely rich, real and present Arnold.  Honan asserts the 
importance of understanding the “subtle, comparative attitude” Arnold introduced to 
cultural issues of modern society.  
Critics, creative artists, and our wisest leaders have turned and will turn to Arnold 
for social perspective, and for that critical attitude which is the best help in our 
national and our international difficulties … He turned from literary, to educational, 
and then to religious topics in his essays and books – with a sense of the complex 
interrelatedness of the forces that make modern life what it is. (1983, vii) 
 
This work, more than any other, demonstrates the continuity in Arnold’s writing, revealing 
how it responds sensitively and constructively to the radically shifting crosscurrents of the 
modern age.  Over the last 20 years there has been renewed interest in the writing of 
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Arnold, particularly with the arrival of the centenary anniversary of his death in 1988. A 
variety of scholarly publications have revisited his life and his work in manners that 
explicate, analyze and offer criticism. The retrospection affords readings that re-
contextualize Arnold’s ideas and reassess the relevance of his legacy in relation to more 
modern sentiment and thought. The frame of reference for what had earlier been viewed 
more narrowly as “political”, “aesthetic” or “moral/religious” in Arnold’s writing has 
expanded and thus blurred those distinctions. The interdisciplinarity of modern aesthetic 
theory refocuses concepts central to his humanist thinking such as freedom, culture and 
equality in new light.  
Recent scholarship offers modern perspectives on Arnold’s view of the capacity for 
moral authority and vital moral agency inherent in the aesthetic about which Arnold’s 
contemporaries may have had only inchoate notions.  It connects Arnold’s views on the 
power of the aesthetic experience with critical theories. And though Arnold’s legacy may 
be difficult to characterize in terms of defined disciplines, a preponderance of scholarship 
confirms the enduring value of his prescient thought on a range of issues related to 
criticism and culture. Pratt (2002) claims, “The ‘main line of modern development’ Arnold 
identified in his poetry came to consciousness as the modernist intellectual crisis assumed 
sharper outline in twentieth-century literature” (p. 2). The shift in emphasis between the 
moral and the aesthetic and his hope for a new age of imaginative reason comes to light in 
more recent theories on secular society, particularly the work of the philosopher, Charles 
Taylor (2007). 
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I believe his intuitions on the affinity of the moral and the aesthetic that appeals to 
natural instincts, together with his profound democratic sympathies, constitute the basis of 
a fuller experience in education and a referendum for reform. Thus I find it surprising that 
scholars in the field of philosophy of education have been slow to engage with Arnold. In 
1998 Routledge published a monumental collection of essays on philosophers of education 
since Socrates (Rorty). In acknowledgements as editor of the collection, Amelie Rorty 
remarks that omissions including Montaigne, Bacon, Luther, Durkheim and Arnold were 
due to a publisher’s constraints on the size and scope of its publication. Notwithstanding 
this acknowledgement that Arnold’s works stands with philosophers that were in fact 
included in the publication, historically the scholarship on Arnold’s educational ideas in 
journals devoted to theoretical and practical work in education has been quite limited.  It is 
my hope that this study will convince my readers to return to search the strands of his 
thought for continuing cultural relevancy, particularly for liberal arts education. I believe 
that Pratt is correct: “His inescapable and still unsettled legacy reaches into our future as 
the work of one of our sovereign educators (2000, p. 18).  
Part of my aim is to recast Arnold’s legacy for philosophy of education in the 
tradition of ancient Stoic practices of self-cultivation and show how the tradition relates to 
modern ideals of German aesthetic education. I do not pretend to be able to “settle” matters 
on how his work should be considered by new scholarship but I hope that my work will 
demonstrate the relevance of his thinking to current debates on liberal arts education and 
invite continued scholarly inquiry into it.  
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Based on a close reading of many of his essays and lectures I elucidate themes 
which connect intertextually as a coherent and accessible philosophy of education for 
democratic societies. I try to explicate concepts that are ambiguous, or no longer convey 
what I interpret Arnold to mean, conserving much metaphor and poetic allusions that he 
uses in timeless and refreshing ways.  Then I juxtapose a reconstructed body of thought 
with ancient moralists and modern theorists to address the value of the aesthetic experience 
to education.    
In Chapter Two, I contextualize Arnold’s call to culture as a continuing process of 
self-cultivation in the light of Bildung and the ancient perspective of philosophy as a way 
of life.   Drawing upon his best-known text, Culture and Anarchy, and several essays on 
criticism and culture in America, I amplify Arnold’s conception of culture.  I also explicate 
key themes in his work in criticism which frame his educational ideal to cultivate the 
individual by developing a practice of reading “the best which has been thought and said in 
the world.”  
The focus of Chapter Three is the standards of literary excellence that Arnold uses 
to judge what he regards the best, most enduring texts. Part of my aim is to correct 
impressions that Arnold advocates a fixed canon to support aristocratic ideals, or any 
ideology, which I argue distorts his legacy. I respond to his critics by explicating his belief 
that the best literature can disrupt the prejudice of ideology and historical contingency and 
supply a new spiritual basis to a society. I examine the main elements of literature which 
Arnold deems the work of creative genius and I clarify the tasks for which he holds 
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literature responsible in modernity. The literary classic comes into focus as a repository of 
moral value that obtain in the conditions of the aesthetic experience.   
Then Chapter Four recontextualizes the perception of literature as pedagogy that 
teaches the wisdom to see things the way they really are, as true science. I try to illuminate 
the reader’s involvement with literature and the unifying and reconciling powers of 
aesthetic phenomena.  And I try to show how literature as a pedagogy of reflection can 
reveal a better condition of life from which our culture is alienated. I also consider 
Arnold’s new aesthetic criteria in relation to other ancient and modern moral theory and its 
standing in relation to the free use of reason. Finally, I follow the path of theoretical 
scholarship that parallels Arnold’s work in order to bring his legacy into better focus in 
relation to his contemporaries and the heirs to his thinking.   
My conclusions in Chapter Five put Arnold together with modern cultural and 
educational theorists on what I consider the most urgent issues of late modernity. Against 
forces that degrade the human condition and threaten the future of society, Arnold’s project 
for education stands as a beacon that lights the way towards a better intellectual and moral 
orientation of the individual and society in the world. I relate the wisdom of Arnold’s 
aesthetic education to current reform theories and developments in American colleges and 









Chapter Two  
A Call to Culture 
 Remember that it is no chance matter that 
 we are discussing, but how one should live. 
Plato, Republic, 352d 
 
 
In Arnold’s day the idea of democracy was seriously questioned and fiercely 
debated among educated people.  Arnold conceived of democracy anthropogenically" as a 
force behind the continuous march of mankind; and he was critical of illiberal opinions 
that would retard its growth. Many critics considered it a potential threat to humanity. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America provoked controversy 
over the notion of the tyranny of a democratic majority and the question of individual 
liberty of  “equal men who revolve on themselves without repose, procuring the small and 
vulgar pleasures with which they fill their souls. Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like 
a stranger to the destiny of all the others” (2000, p. 663). In like ways, Mill’s On Liberty 
fueled the debates with popular libertarian ideals with which Mill proposed to protect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
" anthropogenic: 1889, from anthropogeny  (1839), from Gk. *anthropogeneia , from 
anthropogenes  "born of man," from anthropo- + genes (see genus). 
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individual liberty from the tyranny of the majority. More than political ideals was at stake 
in the cross currents of that period.  
At the same time scientific discoveries, especially Darwin’s radical research, 
destabilized the authority of received tradition.  A flood tide of secularism casts long-held 
religious ideals in suspicious light. This had the effect of unmooring the lives of 
individuals and the moral balance, as it was, of society. Industrialism swept through the 
western world creating new paths to power and wealth and radically new relations among 
people. These disruptive political and social currents, which Arnold observed in England 
and America, motivated Arnold’s most enduring work in education and criticism.   His 
thinking anticipated the Protestant ethic thesis that Max Weber made popular in the early 
twentieth century. Is human existence not degraded in modernity where work and wealth 
are valued as the end goals of life’s pursuits?   
Arnold wondered, too, what authoritative register would measure value in the new 
societies? Aristocratic governing bodies had set and enforced the standards for relations 
among men but now these gave way to democratic criterion. Where a new creed of work 
and wealth triumphs over simpler human associations and ancient gods, what is the effect 
on the character of man? What movement of mind accompanies the worship of power and 
technology? Arnold observed the English and Anglo/American cultures of his day and it 
seemed to him that the price of the progress of industry was the soul of humanity. Lionel 
Trilling articulates the modern cultural phenomenon that was a topic for Arnold and other 
literary figures of the time:  
Men began to recognize the existence of prisons that were not built of stone, or 
even of social restrictions and economic disabilities. They learned to see that they 
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might be immured not only by the overt force of society but also by a coercion in 
some ways more frightful because it involved their own acquiescence. The newly 
conceived coercive force required of each prisoner that he sign his own letter de 
cachet, for it had established its prisons in the family life, in the professions, in the 
image of respectability, in the ideas of faith and duty, in (so the poets said) the very 
language itself. The modern self …was born in a prison. (1950, p. xii) 
 
Arnold envisioned a model of public education grounded upon his hope of 
redeeming the dignity of individuals and society through the active power of culture. In his 
essay, “A French Eton,” he wrote, “Human dignity needs almost as much care as human 
sensibility. First, undoubtedly, you must make men feeling; but the moment you have done 
that, you must lose no time in making them magnanimous” (Complete Prose Works VIII, 
p. 292).# He called himself “a liberal of the future” and was reconciled to the reality that 
cultural transformation takes generations. But his writing conveys patience and optimism 
for a spiritual renewal and a new epoch of progress in the future of humanity.   
The enduring value of his work rests in its contribution to the millennia-old 
tradition of self-cultivation. Arnold’s classical education initiated him into this tradition 
and his profound respect for the dignity of human life called him to advocate it.$ Hadot 
echoes Arnold’s philosophy: 
[T]he normal, natural state of men should be wisdom, for wisdom is nothing more 
than the vision of things as they are, the vision of the cosmos as it is in the light of 
reason, and wisdom is also nothing more than the mode of being and living that 
should correspond to this vision. (2006, p. 58) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Hereafter, citations from The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold will be referenced with CPW, then 
volume and page number. 
 
3 This tradition is also known as Wisdom Philosophy or, as Pierre Hadot introduced it to modern scholarship, 
“Philosophy as a Way of Life” (1995). 
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This tradition of self-cultivation reflects the strong influence of the German tradition of 
Bildung, particularly the writings of Schiller and Goethe.% But Arnold offers his own brand 
of Bildung, which bears the distinct imprint of his English upbringing and his deep 
democratic sympathies. His organic view of democracy bridges humanistic tradition with 
newer humanitarian ideas. It is not exclusively self-regarding like the earlier German 
tradition that Thomas Mann describes: 
The inwardness, the culture [‘Bildung’] of a German implies introspectiveness; an 
individualistic cultural conscience; consideration for the careful tending, the 
shaping, deepening and perfecting of one’s own personality or, in religious terms, 
for the salvation and justification of one’s own life; subjectivism in the things of 
the mind, therefore, a type of culture that might be called pietistic…. one in which 
the world of the objective, the political world, is felt to be profane and is thrust 
aside with indifference, ‘because’, as Luther says, ‘this external order is of no 
consequence.’ (as cited in Bruford, 1975, p. vii) 
 
The call to culture in Arnold’s view answers a natural instinct that reconciles human 
freedom with the material world. His concept of Bildung is egalitarian rather than elitist. 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche espouse a more radically individualistic doctrine in which the 
highest and most lasting pleasures of the mind are the exclusive reserve of a small minority 
of the population. Human freedom belongs to the rare genius that stands aloof from the 
world.  By contrast, Arnold conceives of a salvation which liberates the masses. “The 
beloved friends of humanity have been those who made it feel its ideal to be in the things 
of the mind and spirit, to be in an internal condition separable from wealth and accessible 
to all” (CPW II, p. 322). German indifference to politics and the material world develops 
into a notion of critical distance and impartiality in Arnold’s view, subjecting habit to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
4 See DeLaura (1988) and Lovlie, Mortensen, & Nordenbo (2002). 
 
! 14!
pragmatic scrutiny and change.  An aesthetic appeal to natural human instincts anticipates 
a harmonious balance between industry and its promise of material advantages and the 
inward pleasures of the mind as education becomes available to all.   
His radical and highly debated views on democracy beckon us to reevaluate our 
understanding of it in relation to our personal lives and the historical life of civilization.& 
His writings on these subjects and his claims regarding the interventionist and educative 
value of literature, which are the focus of my work here, cannot be fully appreciated 
without understanding key themes of his social and political thought. Thus before 
considering Arnold’s aesthetic pedagogy I will offer in this chapter a brief expository 
review of his most popular text, Culture and Anarchy. The purpose of this review is to 
orient readers to a perspective of democracy that is significantly more than merely an 
organizing concept in political theory. In addition, I will rely upon his lectures to explicate 
his understanding of the modern human condition, his assessment of which shapes his 
educational philosophy. I will make connections between these published lectures (“The 
Functioning of Criticism,” “Schools and Universities on the Continent,” “A French Eton,” 
“Democracy, Equality and Numbers”) to further explicate the background to his thinking 
on the condition of man in modernity, his assessment of which shapes his educational 
philosophy. I hope that my effort to condense the enormity of his thoughts on the progress 
of culture into a single chapter here will not leave my readers unconvinced about Arnold’s 
expectations for culture to enlarge the individual self-image, and to restore modern men 
and women to a fuller life in society. I hope to provide a sufficient overview of his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Novak (2002a). This work provides a more comprehensive historical context for Arnold’s work and a 
cultural historical perspective of Anglo/American democracy. 
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thinking to frame the important focus I want to bring to Arnold’s ideas on literature as a 
means, a technology of self-cultivation.  
 
Culture and Anarchy 
Arnold’s best-known series of essays, published in book form in 1869 as Culture 
and Anarchy, responds to conditions in England and America when it was published.  It is 
however more prophetic than historical and rooted in timeless and universal questions of 
human flourishing. The subtitle, “An Essay in Political and Social Criticism,” indicates 
that Arnold pulled together many strands of his writing on literature, religion, and cultural 
and literary criticism into a single text that would embody the most important themes of his 
life’s work. But Culture and Anarchy is not political theory per se. To read it as such risks 
missing the subtle strands of profoundly deeper thought on the life of human civilization. 
The book was originally intended for a popular audience which had limited or no 
exposure to cultural ideas through formal education. The majority of his intended readers 
depended upon newspapers and other popular media for most of their information about 
political and social issues. In common vernacular Arnold attempts to explain the existential 
imperative that connects many of his other essays and lectures in a register that received 
much attention and much criticism.  In often preachy, sometimes shrill, and occasionally 
sarcastic tones, but also with a few surprising, well-placed flourishes of humor, Arnold 
addresses his public on the most serious topics of human existence. His reading public 
includes his critics, political and religious leaders who he names directly and speaks to in a 
kind of running correspondence throughout the text. His preachy tones seem intended to 
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unsettle his readers and arouse interest and emotions about ideas for which they have 
limited intellectual background.   
Following his arguments requires some investigation of words in common usage. 
For instance, he reframes popular notions of curiosity to introduce the ground of scientific 
passion, an intellectual gateway to the effort to see things as they really are. Arnold wants 
to convert the public fascination with science by opening its intellectual horizons to 
matters of human nature and human experience.  He insists that to do so, one must be able 
to see beyond the machinery of modern life to the end for which machinery is valuable. 
Machinery here is synonymous with technology or any system such as work and wealth, 
industry and politics that is a means to something else. Machinery, he insists has come to 
be regarded as an end in itself and, pursuing it for its own sake, we exaggerate its 
importance.  
Faith in machinery is … our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly 
disproportioned to the end which this machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to 
serve; but always in machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself.  What is 
freedom but machinery? What is population but machinery? What is coal but 
machinery? What are railroads but machinery? What is wealth but machinery? 
What are religious organizations but machinery? (CPW V, p. 96) 
 
Arnold aspires to a secure faith in culture that would radically reorient our experience of 
life. People of culture are called to revalue machinery including freedom as the means to 
improve oneself and the general human condition. Culture, by its “single- minded love of 
perfection” reveals the essential character of human nature which “follows one law with 
poetry.” Herein is the central theme of the text, that culture elevates reason and natural law 
over the unexamined operations of human expedience. In his view culture is a process 
originating as an inward spiritual activity that ascends to sweetness or beauty and 
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intellectual light and leads to fuller life in sympathy with others. It overcomes stock 
notions and mechanical actions to discover an intelligible, “steadying law of things.” 
Culture connects metaphysically to a law beyond physis or science. 
Now, the [ordinary self’s] great defect being a defect in delicacy of perception, to 
cultivate in him this delicacy, to render it independent of external and mechanical 
rule, and a law to itself, is what seems to make most for his perfection, his true 
humanity. (CPW V, p. 92) 
 
 Delicacy of perception is needed to penetrate habits of mind degraded by materiality and a 
loss of connection to forces that carry mankind forward in its evolution.  It takes delicacy 
of perception to see a larger spectacle of life and reorder man’s place in the cosmos; this 
larger view brings him to reorient his moral basis in the course of human history. Thus the 
spiritual practice Arnold has in mind requires seeing things differently, a refined 
perception that sees more.  
The power which aims at moral perfection in Arnold’s view cannot be satisfied 
with relative moral perfection which confuses the activity of doing as one likes with the 
results of the activity. Arnold takes aim at Mill’s concept of individual liberty as a political 
end. He is more interested in what we may do when we are free to do what we like; he 
insists that personal liberty must be subordinated to right reason. Moreover, individual 
perfection cannot be achieved without a general perfection.  On the premise that we are 
alienated from one another in our everyday selves, separate, personal, at war, he argues we 
are only safe from one another’s tyranny when no one has any power.  But by extension, 
that security cannot save us from anarchy, the great threat to culture (CPW V, p. 134).  His 
educational ideal is the perfection of the individual; the process of the cultivation of the 
individual ultimately leads outward to humanity. By our best self he says that we are 
! 18!
united in harmony with the rest of humanity. The idea of the expansion of our humanity as 
individuals and members of “one great whole” aligns ethical and moral aims, externalizing 
the process of perfection.  
Greatness, he asserts is a spiritual ideal arrived at through habits of mind that 
cultivate a continuous expansion of wisdom and beauty. He rehearses again and again the 
meaning of culture as the pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know the 
best which has been thought and said in the world.  He eschews denotation of culture as 
anything highbrow or bookish or any connotation of what is fashionable. Yet somewhat 
paradoxically he asserts repeatedly that culture depends on reading, observing and 
thinking and rests on authority therein. The point is that it matters a great deal what one 
reads. This important secondary theme of the book, germane to the current study, is that 
culture originates in an aesthetic practice of reading the best ideas that mankind has 
generated, reflecting on those ideas and observing their relevance to one’s personal life. 
The proposition that ideas in literature and aesthetic phenomena implicitly teach wisdom 
and beauty contained here weaves together much of Arnold’s writing. Literature provides a 
glimpse of efflorescence, what might be attainable as a result of a new perspective on the 
present life. Readers are drawn to the light of culture and refined perception through a 
literary practice that expands consciousness.  
Lionel Trilling’s (1972) valuable insights remind us of how Arnold and his 
educated contemporaries viewed the mind and the power of ideas. The belief “that what 
mind might encompass of knowledge of the physical universe has a direct bearing upon the 
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quality of human existence” (p. 6) became an intellectual touchstone of the age. Trilling 
also explains the concept of mind that influenced Arnold’s generation: 
What mind is, and what it should be, and what part it ought to play in human 
existence became an issue of public policy at least as early as the eighteenth 
century. If we regard the history of Europe between the Puritan revolution of the 
seventeenth century in England and the yet more drastic revolution in France at the 
end of the eighteenth century, we cannot fail to be aware of a new element in the 
life of mankind – the ever-growing power of ideas. (pp. 10-11) 
 
Trilling credits the Romantics for insisting that feeling, imagination and will were integral 
to a proper conception of mind and that its powers grew from their development more than 
from the mind’s powers of analysis and abstraction (1972, p. 12). Beyond merely scientific 
reasoning, ideas such as democracy and equality, thought about imaginatively, could stir a 
movement of mind and thus a movement of society. In this emphasis on feeling and 
imagination Arnold is firmly aligned with the Romantic tradition.  His philosophical 
orientation anticipates the twentieth century antagonism between (materialist) analytic 
philosophy and (idealist) non-analytic philosophy.   
An older derivation motivates Arnold to preach the power of ideas associated with 
the inward activity of the mind which ideas nurture. In the light of ancient philosophy the 
force of ideas sets the foundation of a metaphysics that frees us from boundaries of 
historical contingency and opens us to a deeper understanding of the present. I will address 
these big ideas in subsequent chapters.    
  Students of Arnold must look to other essays and lectures to discover more about 
how he wants us to read to cultivate the self, what he wants us to read, and why.  The 
primary focus of Culture and Anarchy is to call attention to the need for the practice of 
self-cultivation by creating doubt about the sufficiency of the materialism of the existing 
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culture. Arnold calls his readers to take stock of their habits in the light of his critical 
focus, to look inside themselves and to consider what it could mean to re-orient one’s life 
to wisdom and beauty. Indeed, he begins the book by writing “the speech most proper, at 
present, for a man of culture to make to a body of his fellow-countrymen … is Socrates’: 
Know thyself!” 
Arnold dissects his contemporary, classed society to reveal ordinary characteristics 
and generalized class habits,' exhorting his readers to consider a common basis of human 
nature and find in themselves attributes of each segment of the population. Separately, 
each segment is incomplete, wanting a common element.  Arnold’s conviction is that that 
which is common to our nature is drawn to find the best self and this common trait tends to 
make one’s distinguishing characteristic one’s humane spirit.  He asks his readers to 
consider a radical change in the measure of their self-esteem and public regard from 
material having and resting to growing and becoming a collective whole in this humane 
spirit, which will not suffer “one member to be indifferent to the rest.” (CPW V, p. 94)  I 
pause at these words and wonder if today Arnold’s ideas would need a wholly new lexicon 
to penetrate the minds of a population ever more defined by individuality and the measure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 On the aristocracy: “The Barbarians brought with them that staunch individualism… and that passion for 
the assertion of personal liberty… Only all this culture of the Barbarians was an exterior culture mainly: it 
consisted principally in outward gifts and graces, in looks, manners, accomplishments, prowess; the chief 
inward gifts which had part in it were the most exterior, so to speak of the inward gifts, those which come 
nearest to outward ones; they were courage, a high spirit, self-confidence. Far within, and unawakened, lay a 
whole range of powers of thought and feeling” (CPW V, pp. 140-41). 
On the middle-class: “Philistine gives the notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse 
in the resistance to light…. and therein it specifically suits our middle-class, who not only do not pursue 
sweetness and light, but who prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, tea meetings… 
which make up (a) dismal and illiberal life…” (p. 140). 
On the lower-class: “part of the working class is … one in spirit with the industrial middle-class…. 
a great working-class power…. but the vast majority… has long lain half-hidden amidst its poverty and 
squalor – to this vast residuum we may with great propriety give the name of Populace” (p. 143). 
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of one’s ability to acquire and conform to the mechanistic pulse of production and 
consumption.     
Observing the English Victorian middle class in an earlier essay he finds them 
with a spirit not very open to new ideas, and not easily ravished by them; not, 
therefore, a great enthusiast for universal progress, but with a strong love of 
discipline and order, - that is, of keeping things settled, and much as they are; and 
with a disposition, instead of lending himself to the onward-looking statesman and 
legislator, to act with bodies of men of his own kind, whose aims and efforts reach 
no further than his own. (CPW II, p. 307)    
 
The American society that he observed first-hand seems to him to exhibit these inherited 
characteristics in exaggerated form. With less of the diversifying traits of the English lower 
and upper classes, Americans’ middle class aspirations for wealth and power appear to him 
as fetishes; satisfied with Philistinism they seem to acknowledge scant authority greater 
than the interests of “ordinary selves.” Where public media is the primary source of 
information on social and political matters and with no other guide to right reason and 
human betterment, it is easy to be satisfied with ordinary habits and lesser ideals. Prophetic 
of a future in which media will monopolize new ideas, Arnold calls a self-satisfied society 
to grow in wisdom and beauty and thus transform itself.  Arnold’s analysis adduces the 
authority of right reason and the best ideas, a topic discussed more thoroughly in 
subsequent chapters.  
Two chapters of Culture and Anarchy are devoted to another important theme that 
we find in several essays, the rival forces of doing and thinking.  Arnold traces religious 
and cultural influences throughout human history and shines a studied light on the modern 
condition.  Consistent with contemporary Western terminology, he describes the two 
points of influence between which one can follow the history of the movement of man’s 
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habits of mind and spiritual disciplines as Hebraism and Hellenism. Hebraism evokes an 
energy driving at practice, a paramount sense of the obligation of duty, self-control and 
work and an earnest reliance on the best light available. He regards the opposing force of 
Hellenism as the intelligence driving at ideas that are the basis of moral practice and the 
sense for the development of practice and its changes and the impulse to know and adjust 
them harmoniously (CPW V, p. 163). While the ultimate aim of both forces is man’s 
perfection or salvation, they differ measurably in how the goal is pursued.  His analysis 
also points to the related idea of sin and the difference in attitudes towards it: the Greek 
quarrel with man’s physical appetites is that they hinder right thinking but for the Hebrews, 
physical appetites hinder right acting. The progress of civilization depends on balancing 
these forces.  
Arnold’s scrutiny yields a variety of distinctions between Hebraism and Hellenism 
and, relying again on rhetorical repetition, he tries to infuse these ideas in the minds of his 
readers. To wit: The most important idea of the Greek force is to see things as they really 
are; the main idea of the Hebrew and later Christian force is conduct and obedience. 
Hellenism follows the whole play of a universal order, careful not to miss any part of it or 
to sacrifice one part to another; Hebraism seizes upon certain plain, capital intimations of 
the universal order and remains focused intensely on the study and observance of them. In 
terms familiar to readers of his other essays, Hellenism is characterized by spontaneity of 
consciousness and Hebraism by strictness of conscience (CPW V, p. 163). The spirit of 
Hellenism as the means of restoring equipoise functions as intervention. 
To get rid of one’s ignorance, to see things as they are, and by seeing them as they 
are to see them in their beauty, is the simple and attractive ideal which Hellenism 
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holds out before human nature; and from the simplicity and charm of this ideal, 
Hellenism and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is invested with a kind of 
aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and 
light. (CPW V, p. 167)  
 
 His account of how we arrived in our modern condition follows that of other 
historians and cultural thinkers who have looked at the dialectical movement between faith 
and reason since ancient times. The movements follow man’s shifting posture towards the 
world from a natural, liberal pose to one tethered to a dominant ideology.  
As one passes and repasses from Hellenism to Hebraism, from Plato to St. Paul, 
one feels inclined to rub one’s eyes and ask oneself whether man is indeed a gentle 
and simple being, showing the traces of a noble and divine nature; or an unhappy 
chained captive, labouring with groanings that cannot be uttered to free himself 
from (sin to which we must die). (CPW V, p. 169) 
 
When the unchecked appetites of the ancient Greeks eclipsed their monumental 
potential for wisdom and beauty the pendulum swung towards strictness of conscience and 
self-control and Hebraism ascended as the basis of conduct and orientation to the world. 
On Arnold’s read of history, the Christian story of self-sacrifice - by the example of the 
one ultimate sacrifice - offered the counterforce to rescue men who could deny themselves 
nothing.  The humanist origins of Christian ethics ushered the cultural prosperity of the 
Renaissance.  Then the powerful Puritan influence in the seventeenth century was a 
reaction to the moral weakness that characterized the later Renaissance. 
The Renascence, that great re-awakening of Hellenism, that irresistible return of 
humanity to nature and seeing things as they are, which in art, in literature, and in 
physics, produced such splendid fruits, had, like the anterior Hellenism of the 
Pagan world, a side of moral weakness, and of relaxation or insensibility of the 
moral fibre…. and again this loss of spiritual balance, this exclusive preponderance 
given to man’s perceiving and knowing side, this unnatural defect of his feeling 
and acting side, provoked a reaction. (CPW V, p. 173) 
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To those historians who take Hebraism as the law of human development, Arnold objects 
that the human spirit flows deeper than its practices; only when the forces of knowing and 
doing are in balance can we realize our potential for wisdom and beauty.  A key thesis, 
central to his cultural theory, is contained in this account. That is, that we have been 
progressing toward a harmonious balance between these two cultural forces since the 
Hebraizing shift of primitive Christianity began over two thousand years ago. But on this 
view the Puritan influences on modern social and political developments have contravened 
the natural order. Their menacing mechanistic world-view and lack of humane spirit 
alienates us from the world and ourselves and sets us at the gates of cultural anarchy.  The 
problem is not merely dehumanizing mechanistic forces but also blindness to our condition 
and the false view that we control our objective reality.  Culture acts as the power of a 
disinterested play of consciousness upon stock notions and habits, that is, it acts as 
criticism to penetrate impoverished views and restore access to greatness.  
 In the concluding chapters of Culture and Anarchy Arnold considers the dangers of 
prioritizing the right of doing what one likes and undervaluing right reason as lawful 
authority. The legacy of Puritanism in this account is that, having conquered a limited part 
of our nature, we allow unchecked liberty to the remainder. Thus the other aspects of our 
nature and our potential for greatness are sublimated. We follow canons of “truth” as 
talismans instead of relying on the light of reason to judge for ourselves. Arnold’s call to 
culture hinges on an intellectual deliverance that will penetrate the totalizing effects of the 
habits of unintelligent custom in order to restore our path to human flourishing.  
[W]hat we seek is the Philistine’s perfection, the development of his best self, not 
mere liberty for his ordinary self. And we no more allow absolute validity to his 
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stock maxim, Liberty is the law of human life, than we allow it to the opposite 
maxim, which is just as true, Renouncement is the law of human life. For we know 
that the only perfect freedom is … an elevation of our best self, and a harmonizing 
in subordination to this, and to the idea of a perfected humanity, all the … blind 
impulses of our ordinary selves. (CPW V, p. 173) 
 
Cultural fetishes, pursued mechanically as ends in themselves, totalize the whole of 
society, its aims and its values. These preoccupations, such as industrialism, free trade and 
the production of wealth (technological advancement and global capitalism would update 
the list), operate without thought of their relationship to human life as a whole. The main 
business of culture he concludes is to create the frame of mind out of which fruitful 
reforms may grow in time to provide a sounder basis of knowledge on which to act (CPW 
V, pp. 221-225).  
Thus the outline of Arnold’s educational reforms is drawn but Culture and Anarchy 
leaves us with many questions. How does culture stand in relationship to education? What 
is the basis of fruitful reforms to secure a sounder basis of knowledge? What conditions 
would create an educational system that would function as the vehicle for these reforms?  
 
The Progress of Culture 
These questions will direct the rest of my study. The beginning of my answer 
examines Arnold’s thinking on the active humanizing power of culture in education. As we 
have seen in Culture and Anarchy, culture promises to suffuse the mind and ennoble the 
spirit. The aim includes both the highest sense of itself and the sense of a collective whole 
defined by the virtues of its shared humanity. The promise of democracy is that culture is 
not an exclusive proposition. Arnold conceives his liberal model of education as the 
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guarantor of those promises. This sets his philosophy of education apart from earlier 
theories which conceive of liberal education for only a segment of the population, the elite 
or the governing classes. It reflects Arnold’s deep democratic sympathies and his profound 
optimism about the future of a global society. Above all, it reflects his faith in human 
nature. He writes in “Schools and Universities on the Continent,” “The idea of a general 
liberal training is, to carry us to a knowledge of ourselves and the world. We are called to 
this knowledge by special aptitudes which are born within us; the grand thing in teaching is 
to have faith that some aptitudes of this kind everyone has”(CPW IV, p. 300). Belief that 
everyone is indeed educable is not a given in modern societies. It is contested by some 
more recent American theories of education that challenge the assumption that all people 
share fundamental instincts of intellect and knowledge, of beauty, of social life and 
manners (Nock, 2010).  Arnold’s faith in human nature and his doctrine of democratic 
education call us to question whether the aim of today’s American schooling reflects a 
limited vision of humanity and an ignoble view of society. 
Arnold calls upon education to humanize men and women in societies where 
standards of conduct, beauty, and social life are without solid footing in unprecedented 
social and political order. As populations become participants in the social and political 
life of their nation, he insists that the most important commitment necessary is for public 
education to provide the foundations for the growth of humane and democratic spirits 
through formative knowledge.  As his mentor, John Henry Newman taught, growth is the 
only evidence of life; growth in this view is measured in human, not economic, terms.  
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Four humanist features anchor his model of education and nourish hopes for the 
advancement of the whole society towards an ideal of perfection. He sees these features 
coalescing to exert a powerful influence on the progress of culture in modern polities 
committed to free public education for all.  
1. Education appeals to natural and formative human drives. It aims at humanizing 
more than individuating the student by shaping the internal formation of the 
mind and spirit of the individual.  
2. In free society, sufficiently large numbers enrolled in public education ensure 
the depth and scale of cultural transformation.   
3. Equal access to fresh ideas and free association to those ideas liberate students 
from historical contingency and exploitation by utilitarian forces. Access to the 
best ideas expands critical consciousness.  Ideas gain currency.  
4. Democratic educational ideals bring students into porous relationships to other 
peoples’ ideas, expanding intellectual horizons and sympathetic spirit.   
These features frame Arnold’s educational model to cultivate all individuals in society and 
elevate the intrinsic powers of multitudes. It is a blueprint for liberal education which 
grounds Arnold’s aesthetic pedagogy.  
Natural Drives. “Our aristocratical class… (has) no perception of the real wants of 
the community at home. Our middle classes…have no perception of our real relations to 
the world abroad…no clue, apparently, for guidance…except the formula of (a) submissive 
animal” (CPW, X, p. 240). This was Arnold’s grim assessment of the English population 
when The Reform Act of 1867 enfranchised the middle class in a democratic reform that 
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would continue to erode the power of the upper class there. In America, with no 
aristocracy to slow the progress of the democratic way of life and with the size of the 
population vastly larger, the advance and scale of the movement was profoundly more 
conspicuous. Arnold weighed the dangers and the possibilities of the political and social 
movements that he considered part of an ongoing, natural development in the history of 
mankind.  
In the essay, “Democracy,” he disagrees with Tocqueville’s disparagement of 
political equality and also with Mill’s recommendations to legislate libertarian 
modifications of the new order. He asserts that the spirit of democracy is the result of 
natural and inevitable causes of our human nature “trying to affirm its own essence; to live, 
to enjoy, to possess the world” (CPW II, p. 7). Like self-preservation, Arnold could see no 
force that would alter the course of the powerful drive for equality. In the historical 
progress of man democracy was thus inevitable. The task of critical observers like him was 
to inspire a commitment to create circumstances that would encourage the masses to make 
the best of themselves in this untested social and political order. American democracy and 
all fledging democracies create their own models of society. In Arnold’s view a society 
that is newly self-governing risks dysfunction by having social equality established before 
commonly respected standards of living and social life.  Tocqueville observed,  
I think that in democracies the ambitious are less preoccupied than all others with 
the interests and judgments of the future: the present moment alone occupies and 
absorbs them. They finish many undertakings rapidly rather than raise a few long-
lasting monuments; they love success much more than glory … Their mores have 
almost always been less high than their condition, which very often makes them 
bring very vulgar tastes to extraordinary fortune, and they seem to raise themselves 




But the greatest danger Tocqueville warns for the American Republic comes from the 
omnipotence of the majority. 
If ever freedom is lost in America, one will have to blame the omnipotence of the 
majority that will have brought minorities to despair and have forced them to make 
an appeal to material force. One will then see anarchy but it will have come as a 
consequence of despotism. (2000, p. 249) 
 
Arnold insists that the spirit of society must be cultivated, elevating genuine equality and 
bringing people together by the “humanity of their manners.” Then, “The well-being of the 
many comes out more and more distinctly, in proportion as time goes on, as the object we 
must pursue.” The power of social life, he writes in “Equality,” is “one of the great 
elements in our humanization…. No individual life can be truly prosperous, passed … in 
the midst of men who suffer.… To the noble soul, it cannot be happy; to the ignoble, it 
cannot be secure” (CPW VIII, pp. 288-89).  
Arnold also acknowledges “the certainty that the unsoundness of the majority, if it 
is not withstood and remedied, must be their ruin” (CPW X, p.159). The blind forces of the 
masses need civilizing in order to create a successfully functioning society of equals, he 
reasons, with an education that appeals to human instincts, pushing towards an expansion 
of life (CPW II, p. 11). Then, democracy itself would be an active counterforce to the 
totalizing forces operating in the modern industrial culture which tend to enervate those 
natural instincts for a more expansive life. And education would operate not merely as a 
preparation for society and the workforce but importantly as a process of formation of 
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one’s moral consciousness.  In his view education, more than politics, would secure the 
future of democracy.(   
Scale. Arnold’s visits to the new American nation generated concerns about the 
dangers of a preoccupation with materiality, a life of comfort, and a craving for 
amusement. But his faith in an education that for the first time in history could reach a 
sufficient segment of the population convinced him that it could transform society for the 
common good and make the good prevail.  
What one asks oneself is, why the faultier side in the Athenian character… should 
have finally prevailed rather than the nobler side… One asks oneself whether it is 
inevitable, then, that the faultier side of national character should be always the one 
to prevail finally; and whether, therefore, since every national character has its 
faultier side, the greatness of no great nation can be permanent. And the answer 
probably is that the greatness cannot be permanent of any nation which is not great 
by its mere material numbers as well as by it qualities … Now, in a small 
community like Athens, a community counting its members by thousands instead 
of by millions, there is not a sufficient recruiting-ground from which to draw ever-
fresh supplies of men of the better type, capable of maintaining their country’s 
greatness at a high level permanently, or of bringing it back thereafter it has for a 
time retrograded owing to faults or misfortunes. (CPW V, pp. 291-92; my emphasis 
added)  
 
In “Numbers” he asserts the magnitude of the population in the American 
democracy as its great strength. If everything depends upon increasing the size and 
influence of people who genuinely seek wisdom and justice, as he believes, America was 
the first fertile ground for the life of culture to nourish the whole of society. Unlike earlier 
cultures in democratic Athens and in the ancient Hebrew kingdoms, the scale of modern 
democratic populations can support a mass movement of cultural reform if the political 
will for liberal education is sufficient.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Marcus (1993). 
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 Arnold calls democracy the force in which the actions of a great number of men 
make up for the weakness of each man taken alone. It accepts a relative rise in men’s 
general condition, obtainable as a result of the concerted actions of a great number, as 
something desirable in itself. But he warns that this defining good must find its balance 
between a strong self-reliant people bent on individual achievement in competition with 
each other and mutual cooperation that acquiesces to second-rate ideals (CPW II, p. 13). 
For a self-reliant people to aspire to more than a “middling good” and to work in concert 
for a general good requires an education which acknowledges and commits itself to that 
balance. But the force of the magnitude of a new democracy is both its true promise and its 
great danger. If a materialized multitude, satisfied with mediocrity, prevails then the 
democracy will perish as the ancient empires did. One need not look further than our own 
acquisitive society to observe the degenerative effects of corrupt financial manipulation 
and greed. Arnold’s answer to save it from the fate of earlier empires is to morally fortify 
individuals through the elevating powers of worthy ideas.  
Ideas, New Ideas, and the Progress of Mankind. Arnold has faith in the 
possibility of a future movement away from the “closed and bounded intellectual horizon” 
of the modern era towards a new epoch of expansion, a time “of faith and ardour…when 
the intellectual horizon is opening and widening all around us” (CPW V, p. 92). Its 
progress depends upon the inward operation of fresh thoughts in free play with the best 
ideas which have been thought and said.  
Ideas, their force, their truth, their universality…. Ideas cannot be too much prized 
in and for themselves, cannot be too much lived with. .…There is the world of 




The essay “Democracy” connects the concept of cultivation of the inner self with 
the love of ideas.  Arnold called his contemporaries to consider the revolutionary wisdom 
from France, then “the lode-star of Continental democracy” so that new ideas might 
fertilize older tradition and raise the trajectory of the progress of the society. The best that 
has been thought and said in the world is also a forward looking perspective on knowledge 
that comes from new ways of seeing the world. His doctrine eschews insularity, casting a 
critical eye on provincialism and any manifestation of inflexible thinking that would lead a 
person to act in accordance with unquestioned principles. This is also the central theme of 
his highly regarded essay, “The Function of Criticism.”  
The notion of a free play of the mind upon all subjects being a pleasure in itself, 
being an object of desire, being an essential provider of elements without which a 
nation’s spirit … must, in the long run, die of inanition… It is noticeable that the 
word curiosity, which in other languages is used in a good sense, to mean, as a high 
and fine quality of man’s nature, just this disinterested love of a free play of the 
mind on all subjects, for its own sake … has in our language no sense of the kind… 
But criticism, real criticism, is essentially the exercise of this very quality. It obeys 
an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that is known and thought in the 
world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and to value 
knowledge and thought as they approach this best without the intrusion of any other 
considerations whatever. (CPW III, p. 268) 
 
Arnold’s Hellenic ideal is not only associated with openness but also with the active virtue 
of curiosity and a passion for inquiry. A love of ideas would thus subject any kind of 
tutelage to questioning and thereby expand the intellectual borders of knowledge. Recent 
scholarship on cosmopolitanism and the cultivation of detachment places Arnold in the 
tradition of cosmopolitanism based on these views which subject stock notions, custom 
and habits of mind to the scrutiny of objectivity, critical reason and aesthetic free play 




Nations are not truly great solely because the individuals composing them are 
numerous, free, and active: but they are great when these numbers, this freedom, 
and this activity are employed in the service of an ideal higher than that of the 
ordinary man, taken by himself. (CPW II, p. 18) 
 
In Victorian England, as in most of man’s history, the elite class supplied standards for the 
common man. What would supply the new democracy with adequate ideals that would 
secure a collective dignity and greatness? How could the minds and spirits of the mass of 
people be raised to the highest sense of itself and avoid the dangers of the power of an 
unguided multitude? “All the liberty and industry in the world will not ensure … high 
reason and a fine culture,” Arnold asserted.  “In modern epochs the part of a high reason, 
of ideas, acquires constantly increasing importance in the conduct of the world’s affairs” 
(CPW II, p. 24).  
Arnold believed the injustice of the older order of the English aristocracy was in its 
denial of an obligation to the masses to attend to the spirit of the individuals and thus to 
raise the crowd up in its own desires. The chance for new democracies is to be elevated in 
a way that it can be admired as a model which would reinforce its merits. Expanding and 
elevating the moral consciousness of its individuals heightens the image of the whole of 
society.  Thus the new order can become worthy of being followed; a noblesse oblige of a 
new order (CPW II, p. 14). Then individuals who comprise it would naturally be inclined 
to protect their culture and its power would be generally enhanced.  Integration of a people 
at a social level would thus have far reaching effects at a political level (p. 14).  
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In “Democracy” he reverts to the subject of an earlier lecture, “On the Modern 
Element in Literature,” evoking the ideal of the spectacle of another epoch when culture 
elevated the intellectual life of the society, its arts, its politics, and its sciences.  
The most interesting, the most truly glorious peoples, are those in which the 
alliance of (culture and character) has been effected most successfully, and its 
results spread most widely. This is why the spectacle of ancient Athens has such 
profound interest for a rational man; that it is the spectacle of the culture of a 
people. It is not an aristocracy, leavening with its own high spirit the multitude 
which it wields, but leaving it the unformed multitude still; it is not a democracy, 
acute and energetic, but tasteless, narrow-minded, and ignoble; it is the middle and 
lower classes in the highest development of their humanity that these classes have 
yet reached. It was the many who relished those arts, who were not satisfied with 
less than those monuments. (CPW II, p. 25) 
 
Another profoundly prophetic assertion in that essay demands national self-examination by 
all modern States: “character without culture (for men and nations) is … something raw, 
blind, and dangerous” (p. 25).  
 
Conclusion 
 I have tried to outline how Arnold’s response to the challenge of the modern human 
condition motivated his work in education and cultural criticism. Ideas for Arnold are the 
lifeblood of civilization, and he tries to float his ideas on a stream of interests found in the 
texts I have drawn upon here. He wants the stiff-necked Philistines to gain buoyancy as 
well, supported by heroic intellectual curiosity so that old habits of mind give way to a 
more flexible, critical consciousness. Then reason carried higher by feeling and 
imagination can be relied upon as the basis of moral practice.   
His conception of culture is one of active interventionism, standing against 
atomizing forces that dehumanize individuals in modern society. But on this view culture 
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is a technology of the spirit more than a political tool. His conception of democracy as a 
natural human drive shapes his social and political outlook and inspires his aspirations for 
the restoration of human dignity and an ideal of perfection for humanity. In response to the 
process of secularization, Arnold preaches a gospel of perfection for a secular faith in 
culture.  
 His project for education is based on a practice of self-cultivation in the long 
tradition of wisdom philosophy that brings a free play of the mind to objective reality.  It 
aims at autonomy at a social and political level but moreover, as the following chapters 
should make evident, his project elevates human freedom to a much higher plane. Public 
education based on formative knowledge would subjugate instrumental knowledge and 
vocational training to a literary pedagogy that satisfies common instincts in human nature. 
I hope to reaffirm the remarks of H. R. Super, the editor of Arnold’s collected works, 
“Matthew Arnold was an educator in the true sense of the word. Watching Democracy 
breed self-satisfied Philistines, he realized that not all the liberty and industry in the world 
would insure the rule of right reason. If we are to survive, he said, we must seize on the 
best and make it prevail. The fate of civilization depends on our schools” (CPW II, cover). 
 Is the best that has been thought and said in the world adequate pedagogy to restore 
consciousness of an unmediated world in concert with the one law with poetry? If as 
Arnold believes, great literature can instill a delicacy of perception to see life steadily and 
to see it whole then there may be reason for optimism. In the next chapter I consider 




But be his 
My special thanks, whose even-balanc’d soul, 
From first youth tested up to extreme old age, 
Business could not make dull, nor Passion wild: 
Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole: 
The mellow glory of the Attic stage; 
Singer of sweet Colonus, and its child.! 
     From Arnold’s To A Friend, 1849 (1909, p. 40) 
            
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In this sonnet Arnold praises Homer, Epictetus and Sophocles. To see life steadily and see it whole would 









 Nor love thy life, nor hate; but, what thou liv’st, 
 Live well; how long or short permit to heaven. 
 Milton, Paradise Lost 
 
Matthew Arnold writes a great deal about what he considers the best, most 
enduring works of literature, its style and composition, and the elements that make it 
prevail as what we refer to as classic. In numerous essays, most notably, “Preface to the 
First Edition of Poems,” “On the Modern Element in Literature,” “Preface to the Second 
Edition of Poems,” “The Study of Poetry,” and “On the Study of Celtic Literature,” he 
defines the idea of aesthetic excellence in literature. In his critical works “Marcus 
Aurelius,” “Milton,” “Dante,” “Count Leo Tolstoi,” “Wordsworth,” and others we have 
examples of his literary ideal. I use this chapter to pull together Arnold’s ideas on the best 
that has been thought and said in the world in order to frame what he suggests reading and 
contemplating for the inward development of the individual. I hope it will refocus Arnold’s 
readers’ attention towards conceptual standards for literary excellence and away from the 
notion of a fixed canon of literary work, which I assert is inconsistent with Arnold’s 
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project. What I hope to make evident are standards of literary criticism that apply equally 
to ancient and modern texts with which he was familiar, as well as to texts he had not read, 
and literature published after his time. Arnold’s idea of classic literature is fluid and 
evolving based on a standard of excellence which is not partial to any particular tradition. 
While my primary aim is to recommend his literary ideal, to which end I try to explicate 
his instincts and intuitions as well as his studied criticism, I do not mute my own voice 
where it may add emphasis or update his.  
We know from the last chapter essentially why he recommends reading, that is, to 
elevate the reader’s experience of humanity; and the following chapter will explore in 
more detail Arnold’s thinking on the experience of reading as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
But first I want to focus on his views about the aesthetic object which prevails as a literary 
classic. In his work in literary criticism Arnold shows that the best that has been thought 
and said educes wisdom and beauty and thereby teaches us how to live in the world. And 
by its conciliatory powers it affirms the integrity of the individual in a world experienced 
as fragmented.  
Arnold’s expectations for excellent poetry and literature (I will use these terms 
interchangeably as he does) relate to the work’s intellectual clarity, which because of the 
art of its creator uniquely penetrates the minds of its readers with ideas that inspire the 
most beautiful and profound elements of human nature. The effect of the art upon its 
readers completes the creative process and makes the difference between merely good and 
excellent literature. Arnold indicates that difference, referring to the shortcomings of two 
of his notable poems, he asks, 
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but what does it do for you? Homer animates – Shakespeare animates – in its poor 
way I think ‘Sorab and Rustum’ animates – the ‘Gipsy Scholar’ at its best awakens 
a pleasing melancholy. But this is not what we want.  
 The complaining millions of men 
Darken in labour and pain –  
what they want is something to animate and ennoble them – not merely to add zest 
to their melancholy or grace to their dreams. (Lang 1996, I, p. 282) 
 
He blames the melancholy of his own nature for the failure of his poetry but that failure 
can be seen to extend to Victorian literature generally. Victorian nostalgia cannot 
adequately stir a reader’s mind to self-discovery as Arnold expects of the best literature. 
He wants literature to open new perspectives to seeing the way to a fuller existence. More 
than merely visionary, the best literature is a dynamic education on how to live life. It is an 
authoritative register of individual and collective dignity and greatness. The best that has 
been thought and said edifies. I draw upon some specific literary examples to try to make 
evident how literature edifies. Then I relate the evidence to Arnold’s more abstract doctrine 
on the literary ideal. 
 
Artistic Genius and Ideas that Turn the Mind 
While he describes literary excellence in many of his essays on literary criticism, I 
find Arnold’s remarks on particular writers and particular works extremely helpful for an 
understanding of his literary ideal. For example, of Milton and Paradise Lost he says that 
the soul of his power of poetry at its best resides chiefly in “the refining and elevation 
wrought in us by the high and rare excellence of the great style” (CPW XI, p. 331, my 
italics). Milton brilliantly manages the subject matter of his Puritan epic and the 
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architectonics9 of the poem are powerful, but in Arnold’s estimation it is the effect that the 
poem has on us that is its certain distinction. And while we may not be able to state what 
affects us in the poem, that it affects us is clear. Arnold likens Milton’s style to Pindar, 
Virgil, and Dante, a style which has received “peculiar kneading, heightening and 
recasting…which seems to have for its cause a certain pressure of emotion, and an ever-
surging, yet bridled, excitement in the poet” (CPW V, p. 362). He extols this special 
intensity that the poet delivers as masterpieces of poetic simplicity. He regards 
Shakespeare as a master of this poetic style asserting the playwright’s “instinctive 
impulse” towards style that was the basis of extraordinary beauty of expression, 
“unsurpassable for its effectiveness and charm” (CPW V, p. 364). The effect of the style is 
to penetrate, refine and elevate our humanity by the excellence of the art. 
 Arnold also places Tolstoy’s work in that rare realm of literary excellence. He 
suggests that we take the story of Anna Karenina as “a piece of life” more than a work of 
art. He writes, 
Things and characters go as nature takes them, and the author is absorbed in seeing 
how nature takes them and in relating it. But we have here a condition of things 
which is highly favourable to the production of good literature, of good art. We 
have great sensitiveness, subtlety, and finesse, addressing themselves with entire 
disinterestedness and simplicity to the representation of human life. The Russian 
novelist is thus master of a spell to which the secrets of human nature – both what 
is external and what is internal, gesture and manner no less than thought and feeling 
– willingly make themselves known. (CPW XI, p. 284; my italics)  
 
Arnold credits Tolstoy’s sensitiveness, subtlety and finesse, what he later refers to as 
“delicacy of perception” (CPW V, p. 92) and his fidelity to it for his genius. Tolstoy’s art 
works to give his readers the reality of Anna’s world. There we encounter the most genuine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Arnold uses the term to indicate the structural harmony of a poem as between expression and action. 
! 41!
of personages, together with their pleasures and pains, their observations and reflections 
which are not merely believable but vividly familiar and their conduct, noble and ignoble, 
entirely natural, genuinely human. Even what is painful or unpleasant in this world is 
entirely natural and untainted with “lubricity” that Arnold finds “trouble the senses” in 
many modern novels (CPW XI, p. 292).!!)evin’s spiritual development (which Arnold 
asserts mirrors Tolstoy’s own) is triggered by self-conscious, critical reflection on an idea 
expressed by one of his peasants, ‘living for his soul; living by the rule of God, of the 
truth’ (CPW XI, p. 294). Under the spell that Tolstoy casts, the secrets of human nature 
emerge – ‘make themselves willingly known’ - including those most inward, intimate 
movements of the mind and spirit which give meaning to one’s existence. Levin finds 
freedom:  
‘But my inner life has won its liberty; it will no longer be at the mercy of events, 
and every minute of my existence will have a meaning sure and profound which it 
will be in my power to impress on every single one of my actions, that of being 
good.’ (CPW XI, p. 295) 
 
Anna Karenina is an excellent example of the uncommon master craft that Arnold 
wants to set the standard for literature. Readers experience a messy and complex world of 
Tolstoy’s creation, including intimate inward experiences and external displays of its 
personages. They share the knowledge of a profound spiritual turning and attainment of 
moral confidence and spiritual constancy that Levin undergoes. The ‘piece of life’ in the 
aesthetic moment attains immediacy in our own progress in living with the same emotional 
power of real-world experience. This is because the ideas the story turns on – expressed as 
intimate human perspectives, ethical struggles, and personal reflections – engage our 
sympathies as convincing moral ideas. They relate to timeless human concerns to which 
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every reader may relate and by the creative power of the author become a thing of 
captivating beauty. The ideal of beauty as perfection is “in a word, only truth seen from 
another side” (CPW III, 290). Thus ideas in the mind of a reader have a vital force, a 
certainty that has the “semblance of experience” evocative of Schiller’s “beautiful 
illusion.”  
Arnold refers to this experience in one of his best-known essays, “The Function of 
Criticism:” 
[I]n the Greece of Pindar and Sophocles, in the England of Shakespeare, the poet 
lived in a current of ideas in the highest degree animating and nourishing to the 
creative power; society was, in the fullest measure, permeated by fresh thought, 
intelligent and alive. And this state of things is the true basis for the creative 
power’s exercise, in this it finds its data, its materials, truly ready for its hand; all 
the books and reading in the world are only valuable as they are helps to this. Even 
when this does not actually exist, books and reading may enable a man to construct 
a kind of semblance of it in his own mind, a world of knowledge and intelligence in 
which he may live and work. This is by no means equivalent to the artist for the 
nationally diffused life and thought of the epochs of Sophocles or Shakespeare; but, 
besides that it may be a means of preparation for such epochs, it does really 
constitute, if many share in it, a quickening and sustaining atmosphere of great 
value.” (CPW III, p. 263)  
 
Arnold has confidence in the normative value of ideas in poetry. Preparing the mind for 
new possibilities initiates personal growth in the individual and a sustaining atmosphere, 
widely experienced as valuable, can shape the flow of life in society. Thus literature 
becomes culturally productive.  
  We learn more about moral ideas from his critical essay, “Wordsworth.” In praise 
of what he regards as Wordsworth’s poetic superiority, he asserts its distinctive character 
and greatness is the result of its application of ideas to its subject. Conditioned by the laws 
of poetic beauty, Wordsworth’s art applies moral ideas to his poetic subject, that is, ideas 
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‘On man, on nature, and on human life.’10 As Arnold sees it, moral refers to nothing 
idealistic or didactic; it means no more and no less than how one chooses to live in relation 
to the world and to others in it. He writes, 
If it is said that to call these ideas moral ideas is to introduce a strong and injurious 
limitation, I answer that it is to do nothing of the kind, because moral ideas are 
really so main a part of life. The question, how to live, is itself a moral idea; and it 
is the question which most interests every man, and with which, in some way or 
other, he is perpetually occupied. A large sense is of course to be given to the term 
moral. Whatever bears upon the question, ‘how to live,’ comes under it. (CPW IX, 
p. 45) 
 
As Arnold employs the term, moral refers to the broadest conception of human 
relationships. In his thought, the moral impulse runs towards perfection on an individual 
and collective basis. Moral ideas respect unity as well as pluralism.  
If there is a single essay that seems to encapsulate most of what Arnold wants us to 
appreciate about the standing of moral ideas to the literary ideal I think it is his critical 
remarks on Marcus Aurelius. He regards the Stoics, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius as 
great masters of morals and Marcus Aurelius “the most beautiful figure in all of history.” 
Arnold claims that Marcus’ system of morality “takes possession of human life,” to give it 
“happiness in the practice of virtue” by recommending moral maxims on how to live 
(CPW III, pp. 133-157). His view of the Stoics parallels Hadot’s analysis that emphasizes 
philosophy as practice. Marcus perceives moral order first as an idea and then embodies it 
as a law of life. The philosophy that evolves in his Meditations is a practice of self-
cultivation as Hadot describes. The fascinating power the Meditations have exercised over 
generations, Hadot asserts, is due to the rare feeling that we as readers have of witnessing 
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10 Line from Wordsworth’s poem, The Recluse quoted in Arnold’s essay, Wordsworth. 
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the living practice of spiritual exercises of someone in the process of training himself to be 
a human being (1995, p. 201).  
Even for the ancient sage, Arnold observes a sense of labor and sorrow in his 
march toward his goal and the need for him as for all men of inspiration from a joyful 
emotion to move them to moral action. Marcus’ writings, he says, carry a warmth and 
charm that inspirits men. And he sees this as the peculiar character and power of his 
Meditations. His writing “suffuses” morality with a unique “light of spiritual refinement,” 
in a way that religion lighted up morality.  
It does not melt the clouds of effort and austerity away, but it shines through them 
and glorifies them; it is a spirit, not so much of gladness and elation, as of 
gentleness and sweetness; a delicate and tender sentiment, which is less than joy 
and more than resignation … a sympathetic tenderness. (CPW III, p. 149)  
 
Like the spell Tolstoy casts through Anna Karenina, Marcus’ Meditations captivates his 
readers with a tender charm that takes them inward, the result of the author’s creative 
powers attending to contentment in the practice of life. More than merely a poetic 
description of a spiritual practice, Arnold asserts that Marcus’ artistic genius produced a 
classic text because of its combination of fresh ideas and creative power. It brings alive the 
vibrant inner world of the ancient philosopher/king. His writing excites more than rational 
understanding. Intimate and perplexing personal reflections sensually draw a reader to 
surrender her innermost spirit to the enjoyment of genuine beauty. In the next chapter I 





Criticism of Life and The New Order 
Arnold’s critical comments on Dante’s Divine Comedy draw his readers to consider 
how solitude works in the cultivation of an inner life. He characterizes Dante as “a born 
spiritualist and solitary” and says Dante’s artistic genius is supported by his aloofness from 
the world. Arnold attributes solitariness to the spiritual vitality of the artist which he views 
in the extreme in Dante’s lived example.  
The grand, impracticable Solitary, with keen senses and ardent passions … but with 
an irresistible bent to the inward life, the life of imagination, vision, and ecstasy; 
with an inherent impatience of the outward life, the life of distraction, jostling, 
mutual concession; this man ‘of humour which made him hard to get on with,’ says 
Petrarch; ‘melancholy and pensive,’ says Boccaccio; ‘by nature abstracted and 
taciturn, seldom speaking unless he was questioned, and often so absorbed in his 
own reflections that he did not hear the questions which were put to him;’ ... this 
lover of Beatrice, but of Beatrice a vision of his youth, hardly at all in contact with 
him in actual life, vanished from him soon, with whom his imagination could deal 
freely, whom he could divinize into a fit object for the spiritual longing which filled 
him. (CPW III, p. 9) 
 
Arnold himself maintained a sense of reserve in society but he does not recommend living 
aloof from the world. In order for the outer world not to dwarf a person’s inner life or 
choke free any spontaneous experience Arnold prescribes a more moderate practice of 
inner freedom from the world’s influences and distractions which he refers to as 
disinterestedness. This mode of objectivity is precisely what Arnold praises about 
Tolstoy’s rendering of ‘a piece of life’ in Anna Karenina.11 As a posture in relation to the 
material world, it assumes a certain independence and objectivity.  
Anderson’s recent text, The Powers of Distance (2001), frames a pattern of 
intellectual practices since the nineteenth century that subject aesthetics and human 
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11 See quote above, p. 40. 
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sciences to an ideal of critical distance, consistent with Arnold’s practice of 
disinterestedness as a positive achievement of character and culture. The issue of moral 
character helps define her use of the term “detachment” which she applies across the fields 
of natural science, social science and art, blurring the distinctions between those fields.12 
Anderson sees disinterestedness as a path to seeing things as they really are that promotes 
positive ideals of self-critical practice which challenge assumptions of authoritarianism and 
nostalgia typically associated with the Victorian writers (2001, p. 20).  
Because it grapples with eternal issues of human existence, Arnold considers great 
literature always contemporary. In his inaugural lecture as the Chair of Poetry at Oxford, 
he suggests a synthesis of the moral and critical in literature. When it was finally 
published eleven years later, “On the Modern Element in Literature” contributed a key 
theory which has become a touchstone in his ideas on literary excellence: “To know how 
others stand, that we may know how we ourselves stand: and to know how we ourselves 
stand, that we may correct our mistakes and achieve our deliverance” (CPW I, p. 21). 
Years later when he was asked to select and edit a collection of poems by Wordsworth and 
write a preface for the text, his ideas on literature as a criticism of life were more fully 
developed. It is worth quoting at length from that preface to better appreciate how he sees 
that moral ideas in the best literature intrinsically educe critical consciousness without 
pedantry or didacticism. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Anderson (2001) suggests Arnold’s position on disinterestedness foregrounds cosmopolitanism. At issue 
for Arnold, she writes, is what precise posture should be adopted toward the conditions and challenges of 
modernity. The proper stance from an Arnoldian point of view from which one can contemplate and 
comprehend the world requires a point of detachment (p.96). For a wide-ranging discussion of this issue see 
David Hansen (2011). 
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It is important, therefore, to hold fast to this: that poetry is at bottom a criticism of 
life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful application of 
ideas to life, - to the question: How to live. Morals are often treated in a narrow and 
false fashion; they are bound up with systems of thought and belief which have had 
their day; they are fallen into the hands of pedants and professional dealers; they 
grow tiresome to some of us. We find attraction, at times, even in a poetry of revolt 
against them; in a poetry which might take for its motto Omar Kheyam’s words: 
‘Let us make up in the tavern for the time which we have wasted in the mosque.’ 
Or we find attractions in a poetry indifferent to them; in a poetry where the contents 
may be what they will, but where the form is studied and exquisite. We delude 
ourselves in either case; and the best cure for our delusion is to let our minds rest 
upon that great and inexhaustible word life, until we learn to enter into its meaning. 
A poetry of revolt against moral ideas is a poetry of revolt against life; a poetry of 
indifference towards moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards life. (CPW IX, 
p. 46)  
 
The implication I take from this is that literature that tries to sever the connection of ideas 
to how we live or remain merely what Arnold regards as a dialogue of the mind with itself 
is aesthetically impotent; its capacity to animate or elevate is undermined by negating 
forces. It suggests languor in strains of contemporary art that reject moral and aesthetic 
value in our experience of it.  
One of Arnold’s better-known essays, “The Function of Criticism,” states that the 
proper business of critical power:  
in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, [is] to see 
the object as in itself it really is. Thus it tends to make an intellectual situation of 
which the creative power can profitably avail itself. It tends to establish an order of 
ideas, if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison with that which it displaces; to 
make the best ideas prevail. Presently these new ideas reach society, the touch of 
truth is the touch of life, and there is a stir and growth everywhere; out of this stir 
and growth come the creative epochs of literature. (CPW III, p. 261, my italics) 
 
In this view the best literature unites creative power with critical power to produce a touch 
of life that is not merely representational but permeated with the poet’s disinterested 
perspective on timeless moral ideas. The poet interprets life for us. Presented through the 
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creative process, those moral ideas strike readers with a spark of a truth which may replace 
something upon which they have previously relied but have outgrown. Hence the power of 
art can penetrate the established order and replace it with a new order of ideas. It can fill a 
metaphysical void. Arnold insists art act as a criticism of life and tradition in order to 
originate a new order in modernity. Anderson pairs Arnold with Kant “in identifying 
modernity largely with the critical spirit, or, to adopt Habermas’ terminology, with the 
postconventional interrogation of prevailing customs, routines, habits and norms” (2001, p. 
102). This view refutes Graff’s (1994) gross misinterpretation of Arnold’s project as 
“committed to the Hellenic free play of reason only as long as its dictates coincide with 
those of unreflective custom, tradition, and consensus” (p. 188).  
Graff’s misinterpretation seems to derive from his uncritical association of Arnold 
with proponents of a common culture. His analysis of Culture and Anarchy should be 
considered in the light of his loyalty to the spread of theory in literary and cultural 
disciplines which he presumes Arnold would oppose based on the power of theory to 
challenge traditional ideals of universality. His mistake is to interpret Arnold only through 
Culture and Anarchy, where statements about “Establishments” create ambiguity. Culture 
and Anarchy is missing the broader context that his critical essays supply, especially 
“Literature and Dogma” and those collected in God and the Bible. In the light of a broader 
context Graff would be less inclined to charge as he does: 
For Arnold no true culture can exist without a common basis of things taken for 
granted, a culture impervious, in other words, to the more unsettling effects of 
rational inquiry. It is this view that underlies Arnold’s frequently stated idea that 
great art requires a settled society of implicitly shared beliefs, that the great works 
of the human spirit, as he puts it, “come, not from Nonconformists, but from men 
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who either belong to the Establishments or have been trained in them.” (1994, pp. 
188-189) 
 
In his preface from which this quote was taken, Arnold juxtaposes the utilitarian 
motivations in the morality of Nonconformist Puritan leaders, who he calls “believers in 
machinery,” with a “lover of perfection, who looks to inward ripeness for the true springs 
of conduct” He finds that the most exceptional “Establishment” of men of spiritual 
development is the “cosmopolitan” spirit of originative Christian and Jewish thought 
(CPW V, pp. 237-238). Such spirit rising from inchoate perceptions represents for him 
Hellenic intelligence driving at ideas based on man’s experience with the need for 
goodness rather than hardened dogmatism. The tension that Arnold calls us to notice is 
between the Hebraic tendencies of the Nonconformists and the Hellenic temper of Judeo-
Christian thought and not as Graff asserts, a tension between national tradition and critical 
rationality.  
As Arnold developed his ideas on critical interpretation in Culture and Anarchy we 
can appreciate his more radical call to culture as criticism, 
getting to know, on all matters which most concern us, the best which has been 
thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of 
fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow 
staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following 
them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically. 
(CPW V, pp. 233-234) 
 
In Arnold’s view self-knowledge necessarily comes before effective social and political 
power. But it would be wrong to assume that his literary ideal primarily serves social and 
political functions. The schemes of really fruitful reforms can only grow with time he says 
by cultivating a frame of mind that would make clear the nature of real good and thus point 
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the way to solid operations that would ensure the good for the whole of society (CPW V, p. 
221). Self-knowledge is the first step to cultivating a critical perspective of the good upon 
which a more solid social and political foundation can be built. Culture as criticism is not a 
matter primarily aimed at improving the existing order. It aims at a clarity of purpose that 
may disrupt existing conditions. Arnold’s project for education can thus be radically, 
heroically subversive.  
There is a certain resonance in Arnold’s conception of poetry as a criticism of life 
that he shares with Schiller’s sense of illusion as caretaker of desire and longing. Its 
supreme function will draw the reader to mount “some new step in the arduous ladder 
whereby man climbs towards his perfection; towards that unattainable but irresistible lode-
star, gazed after with earnest longing, and invoked with bitter tears; the longing of 
thousands of hearts, the tears of many generations” (CPW II, p. 325). Wisdom to steady 
one’s step in the eternal march of civilization constitutes the really fruitful reform that 
comes from contemplating the best that has been thought and said.  
At its best, literature’s creative element presents a lucid narrative with intellectual 
clarity that derives from the rare perspective to see life steadily and see it whole. In 
Arnold’s words, 
The grand work of literary genius is a work of synthesis and exposition, not of 
analysis and discovery; its gift lies in the faculty of being happily inspired by a 
certain order of ideas, when it finds itself in them; of dealing divinely with these 
ideas, presenting them in the most effective and attractive combinations, - making 
beautiful works with them, in short. But it must have the atmosphere, it must find 
itself amidst the order of ideas, in order to work freely; and these it is not so easy to 




The literary genius confronts fragments of life and draws together what may appear as 
disparate strands to represent a vector of human evolution as a certain thing of divine 
beauty. In accordance with the law of poetry, something of humanity’s universal and 
constant “truth” presents itself. Pratt (1988) asserts that Arnold’s literary ideals restore a 
unity to the self which is impossible outside the boundaries of art. She associates Arnold’s 
own poetry as a move away from idealizing Romanticism and towards a confrontation with 
the nihilistic vision at the heart of modern literature and his aesthetic reliance on images in 
art “to allow what life denies” with the modern stance of the poet (pp. 81-97). The value of 
literature for Arnold rests on the affirming, unifying power of its art.  
Recent scholarship of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century art theory and 
practice examines how both poetic and pictorial art evidence a “shift in Romantic critical 
theory from a faith in an immutably grounded reality to a concern for and preoccupation 
with vanishings, the amorphous and the indeterminate” (Starzyk, 1994, p. 1). That shift, as 
Pratt (2000) tells us, is the measure by which Arnold is recognized as a modern poet. 
Arnold would argue that the gifted poet captures an evanescence that may appear to an 
average person as merely a glimmer, if it appears at all, when his genius “finds itself in” a 
revealed order of ideas that has ontological status. The spectacle of a world depicted in 
excellent literature he says “is invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy” 
(CPW V, p. 167). 
Arnold’s literary criticism defines the modern direction of a crossroad in literary 
perception that rejects the functional importance in nineteenth century literary criticism of 
finding the meaning of a text. Iser (1978) asserts that the presumption of the critic in 
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Arnold’s day was that the meaning of a work of literature is a message or a philosophy of 
life. The difference that characterizes the modern critic is the conception of meaning as the 
product of an interaction between structured indicators of the text and the reader’s 
imaginative act. That interaction brings something into existence that is found neither 
outside the book nor on its printed page. The text and the reader are no longer subject and 
object and it follows that the meaning is not an object to be defined but rather an effect to 
be experienced (Iser, 1978, pp. 20-27). As Arnold avows, “the touch of truth is the touch of 
life” (CPW III, p. 261).  
The value of art and indeed the life of the spirit today in Arnold’s view depends 
upon something more than purely rational analysis and discovery. “The poetry of later 
paganism,” Arnold tells us, “lived by the senses and understanding; the poetry of medieval 
Christianity by the heart and imagination. But the main element of the modern spirit’s 
life…. is imaginative reason.” He goes on to praise the period in Greek life, the century 
preceding the Peloponnesian war, “in which poetry made … the noblest, the most 
successful effort she has ever made as the priestess of the imaginative reason, of the 
element by which the modern spirit, if it would live right, has chiefly to live” (CPW III, p. 
230). The age of ancient Greece is for Arnold the preeminent example of the rare creative 
epoch in literature which he refers to as modern. To understand more about his conception 
of modern I turn here to his inaugural lecture as the Poetry Chair at Oxford. I examine the 




The Modern Element: A Spirit of Inquiry 
An intellectual deliverance is the peculiar demand of those ages which are called 
modern; and those nations are said to be imbued with the modern spirit most 
eminently in which the demand for such a deliverance has been made with most 
zeal, and satisfied with most completeness. Such a deliverance is emphatically, 
whether we will or no, the demand of the age in which we ourselves live. All 
intellectual pursuits our age judges according to their power of helping to satisfy 
this demand; and all studies it asks, above all, the question, how far they can 
contribute to this deliverance. (CPW I, p. 19)  
 
What Arnold finds salutary in both the age of ancient Greece (Pre-Socratic Greece) and our 
own time is the spirit of inquiry and “free play of the mind” that seeks to see things as they 
really are. Arnold’s intuitions about the obstacles to seeing things as they are, the key 
theme in Culture and Anarchy, anticipate later theorists in the Continental philosophical 
tradition. Writing at about the same time as Arnold, Nietzsche addresses the problem in his 
criticism of Pre-Socratic philosophy: “The sixth and fifth centuries always seemed to 
promise more than they produced; they never got beyond a promise, and an 
announcement” (1984, p. 261). The structure Nietzsche came to see as the pathos of truth 
is drawn out with greater promise in the later work of Martin Heidegger. Alètheia, 
uncovering and revealing, is the saving power that he claims will bring us into a “free 
relationship with that which concerns us from its essence” (1989, p. 313). His well-known 
claim that modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable 
coherence of forces can be seen to extend Arnold’s thought that “we seek to naturally 
combine the pieces of our knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate 
them to principles; and how unsatisfactory and tiresome it would be to go on forever 
learning lists of exceptions, or accumulating items of fact which must stand isolated” 
(CPW X, pp. 62-63). In “Literature and Science,” which I examine later, Arnold famously 
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asserts that the strength and worth of the poet’s criticism of life helps us to relate the 
results of modern science to moral ideas.  
In “On the Modern Element in Literature” Arnold asks what past literature, what 
elements of the spectacle before us will naturally be most interesting to a highly developed 
age like our own? He answers:  
The literatures which have most successfully solved for their ages the problem 
which occupies ours: the literatures which in their day and for their own nation 
have adequately comprehended, have adequately represented, the spectacle before 
them. A significant, a highly developed, a culminating epoch, on the one hand, - a 
comprehensive, a commensurate, an adequate literature, on the other, - these will 
naturally be the objects of deepest interest to our modern age. Such an epoch and 
such a literature are, in fact, modern, in the same sense in which our own age and 
literature are modern; they are founded upon a rich past and an instructive fullness 
of experience. (CPW I, pp. 21-22) 
 
Arnold acknowledged the ambiguity of his lecture and the problem he refers to which 
allies our age with that of ancient Greece.13 We know that his more developed theory of 
literature as art, which teaches how to live, is bound up with his Hellenic ideal. The best 
literature provides each age with a spectacle of an order of life, unique in particular 
conditions yet relating in abstract ways to a world ordered between Hellenist and Hebraist 
habits of mind and energies from which moral practice derives. In Culture and Anarchy 
Arnold insists that the forces that carry mankind forward in its evolution are shaped not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 When Arnold delivered his inaugural lecture as the new Poetry Chair at Oxford he introduced it as the first 
of a course of lectures, a few of which followed but were never published and have been lost over time. The 
course was never completed because Arnold came to feel that his “knowledge was insufficient for treating in 
a solid way many portions of the subject chosen.” Not until eleven years later was the inaugural lecture even 
printed and then with apologies from the author for “ the imperfection of (the) sketchy and generalizing mode 
of treatment” of the subject matter. When he finally did publish it, it was because Arnold felt that it would 
help develop the idea of Hellenism that he had worked out in a more satisfying way and written about in 
Culture and Anarchy. He hoped his earlier attempt to describe the element that he calls modern in literature 
would breathe some greater life into his notion of a Hellenic spirit to carry civilization along its course in an 
uplifting way. Arnold finally printed his inaugural lecture “with the hope that it may serve, in the absence of 
other and fuller illustrations, to give some notion of the Hellenic spirit and its works, and of their significance 
in the history of the evolution of the human spirit in general” (CPW I, p. 18). 
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merely by great ideas that engage the spirit but also in varying degrees by the interpretative 
framework through which the ideas are reasoned and understood. Thus evolutionary forces 
have their basis in all that has preceded each age but in every age the task exists for some 
observers to adequately represent the world for others. In a dialectic which carries mankind 
through alternating periods of intellectual and moral development and fatigue, “of man’s 
… effort to see things as they really are, and the effort to win peace by self-conquest,” he 
contends, “the spirit proceeds” (CPW V, pp. 102-103).  
His lecture, “On the Modern Element,” continues,  
One of the most characteristic outward features of a modern age … is the 
banishment of the ensigns of war and bloodshed.… [W]ithin the limits of civil life 
a circle has been formed within which man can move securely and develop the arts 
of peace uninterruptedly.… An important inward characteristic … is the growth of 
a tolerant spirit; that spirit which is the offspring of an enlarged knowledge; a spirit 
patient of the diversities of habits and opinions. Other characteristics are the 
multiplication of the conveniences of life, the formation of taste, the capacity for 
refined pursuits. And this leads us to the supreme characteristic of all: the 
intellectual maturity of man himself; the tendency to observe facts with a critical 
spirit; to search for their law, not to wander among them at random; to judge by the 
rule of reason, not by the impulse of prejudice or caprice. (CPW I, pp. 21-24) 
 
Arnold indicates aspects of such highly developed characteristics in other historical 
literature with which he was familiar that provide additional examples of the constancy 
that is the fruit of man’s intellectual maturity. In “On the Study of Celtic Literature” he 
examines modern elements in a variety of creative impulses.  
Not in the outward material world of Wales or Ireland does he find the Celtic 
genius but in its inward world of thought and science, towards knowing things as they are 
as a spiritual power (CPW III, p. 298). “Possessing a special, profound, spiritual 
discipline”(CPW III, p. 316, my italics), their bards committed poetry to memory, they 
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survived the Roman conquest and emerged in the twelfth century with a burst of literature 
which survives. He deems sentiment the main basis of its genius. And sensibility, “the 
power of quick and strong perception and emotion, …one of the prime constituents of 
genius,” made the Celts love learning and the things of the mind. The Celts in this essay 
offer an example of the reconciling power Arnold attributes to science:  
true science recognizes in the bottom of her soul a law of ultimate fusion, of 
conciliation. To reach this, but to reach it legitimately, she tends. She draws, for 
instance, towards the same idea which fills her elder and diviner sister, poetry, - the 
idea of the substantial unity of man; though she draws towards it by roads of her 
own. But continually she is showing us affinity where we imagined there was 
isolation. (CPW III, p. 330, my italics) 
  
In this sense, the genius of science finds the law which poetry yields. The modern element 
he wants to emphasize depends on the experience of science which unifies and connects 
more reliably than reductive science which individuates. The essay provides numerous 
examples, especially from philology, to illustrate the reconciling power of Arnold’s notion 
of true science.  
 Arnold finds the crucial difference between the highly developed culminating 
epoch of ancient Greece and the ancient Celtic culture to be a sense of measure and 
patience which he says the sentimental Celts lacked. This explains the Celtic lack of 
success in material and political development as well as the defect in architectonics, which 
he considers the highest power of composition. Thus he concludes that the sensual Celtic 
genius shines in its poetry but misses in the plastic arts:  
Celtic poetry seems to make up to itself for being unable to master the world and 
give an adequate interpretation of it, by throwing all its force into style, by bending 
language at any rate to its will, and expressing the ideas its has with unsurpassable 
intensity, elevation and effect. It has all through it a sort of intoxication of style. 
(CPW III, p. 366). 
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Celtic literature then falls short of Arnold’s standards of excellence despite its conciliatory 
power and the captivating pleasures of its exemplary style because it fails to revert back to 
the world as a medium of criticism to supply a moral basis upon which to act.  
He credits the Celtic influence on the English creative power in style, passion, and 
natural magic. The English genius provides another example of the characteristics of the 
modern age: “Passionate, turbulent, indomitable reaction against the despotism of fact” 
(CPW III, p. 372-373) fires the excellence of Byron and Milton. The fiery impulse of the 
English poets seems to contrast sharply with a more leveled self of our current age. We 
might question whether scientific specialists today trade a sense of being able to order the 
world and ourselves with being open and vulnerable to a world of spirits and forces which 
cross the boundary of the mind and negate the very idea of there being a secure boundary 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 300). Passion and magic, exemplified by the English genius, create 
personal vulnerability and open a person to an expanded consciousness beyond the secure 
borders of the rational mind.  
He finds the genius of the German culture characterized by steadiness, a pre-
eminent freedom from whim or flightiness and patient fidelity to Nature, - in a word, he 
says, science leading it towards a better life (CPW III, p. 342). The plainness of its poetic 
style stands it apart from the Celtic creative power but he pronounces German poetry, with 
Goethe as the preeminent bard, “the only first-rate body of contemporary poetry.” His 
reason for such high accolade has to do with the peculiar demand for intellectual 
deliverance of those ages like our own which may be called modern according to his 
definition. Not since the Greeks, he asserts, has poetry risen to the task of what he calls the 
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grand business of modern poetry – a moral interpretation, from an independent point of 
view, of man and the world (CPW III, p. 380). Goethe stands out among ancient and 
contemporary poets as the rare observer who adequately interprets the collective life of 
humanity, the genius who “has risen to the comprehension of his age” (CPW I, p. 20). He 
is that most uncommon interpreter of life who finds “the true point of view from which to 
contemplate… a significant spectacle” of the collective life of her age (CPW I, p. 22).  
 As students of Arnold know, when contemplating an important theme, a more 
complete doctrine emerges only by drawing on multiple sources. His lecture on Celtic 
literature builds on the skeleton of his earlier lecture on the Modern Element by developing 
the idea of the interpretative task of the poet. From the first lecture we appreciate the 
significance of point-of-view. The rare adequate observer of the spectacle of the collective 
life of her age rises above the limitations of birth and historic contingency to a level of 
comprehension that is unattainable by an ordinary observer. From her elevated perspective 
the poet answers the demand for intellectual deliverance. But not until he delivers his 
lecture of Celtic literature does he declare the need for literature to mediate purpose in life. 
There he refers to Goethe’s task, and inevitably the business of literature henceforth, and as 
it was for the poets in the days of Pericles, to “interpret human life afresh, and to supply a 
new spiritual basis to it” (CPW III, p. 381). To illustrate his point, he contrasts Dante’s task 
as setting forth the lesson of the world from the point of view of mediaeval Catholicism, 
which was the given basis of spiritual life; Dante did not need to make it anew. Even for 
Shakespeare who set forth a world where man’s spirit was reawakened in the Renaissance, 
the basis of spiritual life was still the traditional religion of Christendom (CPW III, p. 381). 
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Now, as it was for the poets of ancient Greece, the task of literature goes beyond the 
aesthetic criteria of style and charm. “It is a work for science” in the sense that Arnold uses 
“true science” for an adequate interpreter to supply purpose and meaning to overcome 
spiritual fragmentation.  Critics, Arnold writes to a poet friend, 
still think that the object of poetry is to produce exquisite bits of images – such as 
Shelley’s clouds shepherded by the slow unwilling wind, and Keats passim: 
whereas modern poetry can only subsist by its contents; by becoming a complete 
magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did: by including, as theirs did, religion 
with poetry, instead of existing as poetry alone, and leaving religious wants to be 
supplied by the Christian religion, as a power existing independent of the poetical 
power. But the language, style, and general proceedings of a poetry which has such 
an immense task to perform, must be very plain direct and severe; it must not lose 
itself in parts and episodes and ornamental work, but must press forwards to the 
whole. (Lang, 1996, 245-6) 
 
Here is Goethe’s understanding of the task of literature, which reflects the enormity 
of his influence on Arnold’s thinking. Goethe reinforces Arnold’s emphasis on 
interpretation as science, affirming spiritual constancy and integrating ideas into a larger 
whole.  
When and under what circumstances, in any nation, does one become a writer of 
classics? There are a number of preconditions: If the writer finds in the history of 
his nation great events which together with their consequences form a harmonious 
and significant whole; if his countrymen exhibit nobility in their attitudes, depth in 
their feelings, and strength and consistence in their actions; if he himself is 
permeated with the spirit of his nation and if he, because of an intuitive 
understanding of this spirit, feels capable of identifying with the past as well as 
with the present; if his native country has attained a high cultural level, thus 
facilitating his own educational process; if he has collected sufficient material and 
is aware of the perfect and not so perfect attempts of his predecessors; and if 
enough favorable external and internal circumstances coincide to make his 
apprenticeship less arduous so that in his mature years he is in a position to 
conceive of a great work, organize it, and produce finally a coherent and unified 








 I have attempted to examine Arnold’s literary criticism within a framework that 
demonstrates its pedagogical value. His literary standards provide a basis for productive 
debates about what constitutes good liberal arts education and literature’s role in it. To 
briefly summarize, the completion of the work of literature in its effect depends upon the 
talent of its creator. The distinction between good (or average) and the best literary art 
centers on its ability to engage our sympathies and raise critical consciousness. Only the 
rare and sensitive genius of any age can achieve an adequate, objective perspective and 
capture a glimpse of evanescence that can yield integrating secrets of human nature; his art 
conveys them with emotion and poetic simplicity. Beauty, through the artist’s creative 
style captivates the reader in an uncommon engagement that awakens more than rational 
perception, expanding the realm of how we experience it.  
Arnold’s claims regarding literature’s power call to mind the most compelling and 
long-standing reasons supporting the value of literary arts to human agency. He insists that 
the greatest contribution to civilization is the power of the best literature to penetrate 
historical contextual limitations and synthesize the wisdom of other ages; as the object of 
critique, the reader constructs her own freer association with timeless ideas in the 
experience of new ontologies. Moral models of temper and attitude, revealed as semblance 
of experience, can shift one’s moral axis and thus be transformative.  
Periods like our modern age call for a spirit of inquiry that reconciles our 
knowledge of life, moral and scientific. When totalizing forces erode a stable moral basis 
to the life of the individual, literature’s affirming powers become increasingly important to 
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the life of society. The artist’s ability to rise to a level of critical comprehension that 
escapes conforming ideologies and degrading utilitarian perspectives to find constancy and 
possibility becomes paramount. Thus the critical power of literature can mediate the 
existing order and subvert what is dehumanizing. Poetic interpretation can reorient the 
individual existentially. Simply put, the best literature can teach us how to live well and 
affirm our place in the world.  
 Giving voice to the same wisdom philosophy that undergirds Arnold’s aesthetic 
measure, with distinct poetic simplicity, Goethe advises the poet in every person: 
Let us take the flow of life as a guide, and on occasion examine ourselves. Then we 
can see instantly whether we are truly alive, and, reflecting later in life, whether we 

















 The world is nothing but change. 
 Our life is only perception. 




The great sixteenth century humanist Michel De Montaigne poses a question that 
should engage educators in any age: “Since all philosophy is the art which teaches us how 
to live, and since children need to learn it as much as we do at other ages, why do we not 
instruct them in it?” (2004, p. 57). Pierre Hadot indicates why modern educators may find 
the question irrelevant by reminding his readers that modern philosophy, “having become 
almost entirely theoretical discourse,” has forgotten the ancient tradition of philosophy as a 
way of life (1995, p. 206). Arnold perceived the fate of philosophy in modernity and 
sought to replace its pedagogical value with literature, believing that fulfilling the potential 
that is the unique natural endowment of human beings requires instruction. Indeed, he 
believes that the fate of society depends on it.  
As Chapter Two demonstrates, Arnold follows the German aesthetic tradition, 
which celebrates art as a key to understanding the world, that is, art as revelatory. His 
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aesthetic doctrine also tries to forge a path between the Anglo/American suspicions about 
art’s ideological inclinations and a more organic interpretation of it as experience that 
eschews ideological pretense. His project for educating people in modern democracies 
depends upon restoring legitimacy to the aesthetic experience. The word aesthetic, deriving 
from the ancient Greek aisthëtikós, means perceptible to the senses; it is generally thought 
to signify value in perceptual experience. The history of aesthetics reflects a dynamic 
association between art and our appreciation and experience of it; thus how we value a 
work of art depends upon our interpretation of it and involvement with it, matters of 
ongoing philosophical debate. Today our perception of art also depends upon a culture’s 
demands for certainty and scientific methods of verification. In this chapter I will shine 
Arnold’s light on the perception of literature. 
 I will explore Arnold’s notion of imaginative reason and his view of the reader’s 
involvement with literature, how we interpret it and its potential effects on the individual 
and society. Building upon the last chapter, I hope to make apparent how our involvement 
with literature can restore integrity to one’s sense of self and overcome the alienation of 
egoism and the hyper-individualistic conditions that threaten modernity. To do that I return 
to several of the essays I drew upon in the prior chapters and turn to others from Arnold’s 
God and the Bible to elaborate his views on the substantive value of our involvement with 
literature and its moral authority. I bring Arnold into communication with later theorists on 
the topics of the unifying nature of literature, interpretation, and the question of freedom as 
it relates to his project for education and his work’s legacy in relation to contemporary 
theory. I will show how Arnold’s call to cultivate the self through the practice of reading 
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the best literary works bridges the oldest philosophical tradition with modern aesthetic 
phenomenology by granting the authority of aesthetic judgment.  
 For rigorous teachers seized my youth 
 And purged its faith, and trimm’d its fire 
 Show’d me the high, white star of Truth 
 There bade me gaze, and there aspire.  
“Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse” (1909, p. 272) 
 
 
True Science  
Arnold writes,  
The design of abasing what is called ‘merely literary instruction and education,’ 
and of exalting what is called ‘sound, extensive, and practical scientific 
knowledge,’ is, in this intensely modern world of the United States … a very 
popular design, and makes great and rapid progress. (CPW X, p. 55)  
 
Few people, I think, would disagree that this observation from “Literature and Science,” 
the essay which R. H. Super deems Arnold’s finest statement of the value of liberal 
education, still represents the general educational trajectory in American schools. Arnold 
tries to convince his audience of their mistake in setting science in opposition to literature 
and of the error of constructing a dualism between the disciplines. “All learning is 
scientific,” according to Arnold, “which is systematically laid out and followed up to its 
original sources … and genuine humanism is scientific” (CPW X, p. 57). All knowledge, 
he says that reaches us through books, including Euclid’s Elements and Newton’s 
Principia is literature. And he insists that literary production serves our natural instinct to 
want to connect isolated pieces of knowledge to our sense of how to act and our sense of 
beauty. Steve Jobs could have made the case for collapsing the duality of science and 
humanities. The product evolution of Apple is an amazing success story about what can 
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come of cross-pollinating technology with human needs and desires and a sense for the 
aesthetic. But Arnold’s conviction about the value of the humanities to the sciences was 
forward thinking for his time and seems so in even in our own.  
 Recall Arnold’s perspective of a work of literary excellence, in “The Function of 
Criticism,” as synthesis and exposition, not merely of analysis and discovery; “its gift lies 
in the faculty of being happily inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere” 
(CPW III, p. 261). He argues that our world demands more than reason alone; modernity’s 
gift is its expanded spirit of inquiry that characterizes a modern epoch. “Literature and 
Science” is an attempt to explain how literary works compliment discoveries of science 
“because they serve the paramount desire in men that good should be for ever present to 
them … to establish a relation between new conceptions, and our instinct for beauty, our 
instinct for conduct” (CPW X, p. 66). We find by experience, he argues, literature’s power 
to engage the emotions, which heightens a man’s scientific training, albeit in ways that are 
difficult to explain. Thus the specialist, through experience of literature, can make more of 
methods of scientific discovery through moral and aesthetic intuitions, with feeling and 
imagination. If a choice is required between humanities and sciences he exhorts educators 
to prioritize the arts that equip us to find natural and necessary currents to connect all 
knowledge. “The glorious beauty of the Acropolis at Athens did not come from single fine 
things stuck about on that hill, a statue here, a gateway there; - no, it arose from all things 
being perfectly combined for a supreme total effect” (CPW X, p. 71). The other side of his 
claim, in the stark example of the Manhattan Project, stands as a sobering reminder of the 
perils of cold science unameliorated by a sense of beauty and a sense of conduct.  
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In a report on Continental Education to the British Schools Commission Arnold 
remarks that one man’s aptitudes are for knowing men and another for knowing the world.  
The circle of knowledge comprehends both, and we should all have some notion, at 
any rate of the whole circle of knowledge. The rejection of the humanities by the 
realists, the rejection of the study of nature by the humanists, are alike ignorant. 
(CPW IV, p. 300)  
  
Arnold’s circle of knowledge metaphor evokes timeless wisdom. Observation and analysis 
yield aspects of integral knowledge as facts but in a larger perspective our understanding of 
the facts is always provisional as today’s interpretation can be overturned by tomorrow’s 
discoveries. Arnold was a great admirer of Emerson and most assuredly read the 
American’s poetic interpretation of the metaphoric circles of life and knowledge. 
Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that around every circle another can be 
drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that there is 
always another dawn risen on mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep opens. 
(Emerson, 2003, p. 225) 
 
In this ancient view that he shares with other nineteenth century naturalists, the supreme 
total effect is the result of harmonious alignment of connected knowledge. Facts in a 
stream of thought become starting points for continuous revision; the product of science 
creates a new object of observation and analysis. “Everything is interwoven, and the web is 
holy;” writes Marcus Aurelius in the first century AD, “none of its parts are unconnected. 
They are composed harmoniously, and together they compose the world” (2003, p. 86). 
True science is continuously constructing and reconstructing knowledge. Fresh discoveries 
illuminate every field of study by their converging currents.   
Restoring unity and reconciling our place in the continuously changing world 
requires more than reason or faith for Arnold. “The main element of the modern spirit’s 
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life … is the imaginative reason.” Recall Arnold’s descriptions of the spirit of cultures that 
marked earlier epochs, “Now the poetry of Theocritus’s hymn is poetry treating the world 
according to the demand of the senses; the poetry of St. Francis’s hymn is … treating the 
world according to the demand of the heart and imagination.” The Renaissance turned 
again toward the senses and understanding in this account; and the German reformation 
turned the world to subjugate the senses and understanding (CPW III, p. 225). His analysis 
of recurring historical cycles of poetic spirit which attend to the demands of the world was 
first made manifest in his poetry and later reflected upon in his literary criticism (Culler, 
1966). The spirit and the promise for modernity in this analysis demand imaginative 
reason, the modern element. The essays, “The Study of Poetry,” “On Celtic Literature,” 
and “On the Modern Element,” shed light on the significance of imaginative reason as a 
key to interpreting the world and man’s relation to it.  
“The Study of Poetry” is a mature reflection on the work of literature which asserts 
its substantial value to a culture that must invent its myth and meaning.  
More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret 
life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear 
incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will 
be replaced by poetry. (CPW IX, pp. 161-162) 
 
Consistent with German Bildung, poetry for Arnold takes the place of religion and 
philosophy in the life of the spirit. The life of the individual which in earlier epochs has 
been nourished by and comforted with the elevating and steadying effects of faith or 
fidelity to ideas as systems of belief needs to learn to rely on the power of poetry to reveal 
wider and deeper perspectives.  
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Turning to his work on Celtic literature brings some clarity. The grand business of 
modern poetry, he says, is “a moral interpretation, from an independent point of view, of 
man and his world” (CPW III, p. 380). While Arnold discounts contributions to the life of 
the material world from Wales and Ireland in his day he is salutary about the enduring 
power of their ancient literature.  
It cannot count appreciably now as a material power; but, perhaps, if it can get 
itself thoroughly known as an object of science, it may count for a good deal, - far 
more than we Saxons, most of us, imagine, - as a spiritual power. (CPW III, p. 298)  
 
In Celtic literature there is a strain that lights upon unity which Arnold tries to describe.14 
“[C]ontinually she is showing us affinity where we imagined there was isolation” (CPW 
III, p. 330). By its creative style the ancient Celtic literature intimates something deep and 
transcendent that is a source of unification and reconciliation. The spiritual power of its 
synthesis operates in a realm in which science and poetry share the same laws. Arnold is 
clear that the source of this power is something other than pure reason. Reason on this 
view is not considered the preeminent natural instinct or power.15 
Imaginative reason mediates our experience, as Arnold sees it, and disrupts the 
duality of science and literature. Then a “law of ultimate fusion” can “deliver” us from an 
unpoetic, atomistic world to new heights of wisdom and beauty. Such is the intellectual 
deliverance that Arnold introduced in his early lecture, “On the Modern Element in 
Literature,” a “harmonious acquiescence of mind which we feel in contemplating a grand 
spectacle that is intelligible to us” (CPW I, p. 20). Like the redemptive power of religion,  
there is an inventive aspect to imaginative reason (Culler, 1966, p. 280). In what Arnold 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See the preceding chapter, pp. 55-58. 
15 For an in-depth consideration of the preeminence of reason, see “A Reason for Socrates’ Face’ in 
Alexander Nehamas (2000).  
! 69!
regards as a complementary association, the creative effort and the critical effort operate to 
illuminate ideas in the mind. “Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact. 
The strongest part of our religion today is its unconscious poetry” (CPW IX, p. 161). A 
synthesis of intellect and feeling, imaginative reason combines the best elements of science 
and religion and goes beyond both. Arnold’s literary critique of the English translation of 
Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus provides his summary version of the radical 
seventeenth century treatise, including his illuminating interpretation of Spinoza’s notions 
of imagination and reason, which align with his own.16 “Only an idea can carry the sense 
of its own certainty along with it, not an imagination;” but the power of imagining is “the 
power of feeling what goodness is” (CPW III, p. 162). Knowledge, in this view, is 
transcendent and unifying.  
I quote Arnold’s description of a vast nexus of knowledge and experience which 
precedes the present age that he considers the legacy of all of humanity. It stands in 
contrast to a modern view of knowledge as information, instrumental facts, useful for 
measuring and controlling.  
The spectacle, the facts, presented for the comprehension of the present age, are 
indeed immense. The facts consist of the events, the institutions, the sciences, the 
arts, the literatures, in which human life has manifested itself up to the present 
time: the spectacle is the collective life of humanity. And everywhere there are 
connexions, everywhere there is illustration: no single event, no single literature, is 
adequately comprehended except in its relation to other events, to other literatures. 
(CPW I, pp. 20-21)  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  Spinoza’s influence is signal in Arnoldian scholarship, although not directly connected to a philosophy of 
education but as his work in interpretation and on God and religion had such profound influence on Arnold’s 
oeuvre.  
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The perspective of a nexus as a model of cultural production yields a rich inheritance of 
connections and continuity that scientific method as currently conceived cannot adequately 
render. Emerson extends the thinking,   
The law dissolves the fact and holds it fluid. Our culture is the predominance of an 
idea which draws after it this train of cities and institutions. Let us rise into another 
idea; they will disappear…. Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series. 
Every general law only a particular fact of some more general law presently to 
disclose itself. (1982, pp. 226-227)  
 
True science, as Arnold conceives it, not only restores a greater dynamic and larger 
dimension to how we comprehend the world, it also shapes the fundamental make-up of 
the individual and the community. 
 
The Unity of Man  
Pierre Hadot addresses the magnitude of the spiritual movement of the individual 
who takes up a practice such as Arnold’s call to culture. “(T)he point is not to forge oneself 
a spiritual identity … but rather to liberate oneself from one’s individuality, in order to 
raise oneself up to universality (1995, p. 210). Recall Arnold’s focus on the reconciling 
power of true science which “draws … towards the same idea which fills her elder and 
diviner sister, poetry, - the idea of the substantial unity of man; though she draws towards 
it by roads of her own” (CPW III, p. 330). The first chapter of Culture and Anarchy is 
entirely devoted to this doctrine. Escaping the limitations of historical contingency with the 
refined perspective of disinterestedness, the individual turns inward in a movement of the 
mind and spirit. Then “culture directs our attention to the current in human affairs, and to 
its continual working, and will not let us rivet out faith upon any one man and his doings” 
! 71!
(CPW V, p. 110) The Arnoldian ideal of a practice of human perfection leads to “general 
perfection, embracing all our fellow-men…. Such is the sympathy which binds humanity 
together” (CPW V, p. 215). In the realm of feeling more than thinking, sympathy realigns 
moral order. “The idea of perfection as a general expansion of the human family,” he says, 
“is at variance with our strong individualism, our hatred of all limits to the unrestrained 
swing of the individual’s personality, our maxim of ‘every man for himself’” (CPW V, p. 
95). “Perfection,” as the aim of a studied practice of reading, observing and reflecting, 
brings the reader to recognize herself in a new standing in relationship to the human 
community.  
Hadot asserts that this process releases the individual from exteriority in the 
material world and inseparably links to a heightening of the mind and spirit, “a higher 
psychic level” in the world of nature.  
This is a new way of being-in-the-world, which consists in becoming aware of 
oneself as a part of nature, and a portion of universal reason. At this point, one no 
longer lives in the usual, conventional human world, but in the world of nature…. 
In this way, one identifies oneself with an “Other”: nature, or universal reason, as it 
is present within each individual. This implies a radical transformation of 
perspective, and contains a universalist, cosmic dimension.… Interiorization is a 
going beyond oneself; it is universalization. (1995, p. 211)  
 
In other words, one could say it frees us to more authentically inhabit the world.  
Thus in turning away from the everyday world of convention and releasing oneself 
to the natural order of things – the law of poetry – we gain a new perspective of ourselves 
in a radically transformed moral alignment. In the view that Arnold and Hadot share, the 
inward growth of the human spirit leads to greater sympathy with the rest of mankind that 
derives from the recognition of a common basis of human nature. Going into ourselves, we 
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(re)turn to universal being. Arnold’s conviction about man’s shared essence has its logical 
outcome in recognizing oneself in community with others as we come to know ourselves 
(CPW V, p. 179).  
Arnold is unequivocal: we need others in order to know ourselves, and self- 
knowledge will ground the possibility of transformative growth. “To know how others 
stand, that we may know how we ourselves stand: and to know how we ourselves stand, 
that we may correct our mistakes and achieve our deliverance” (CPW I, p. 21). He warrants 
that the “supreme characteristic” of a highly developed age is a critical spirit that comes as 
a result of the inward development of the self. The more modern heir to this thinking, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, says all art is a way of confronting ourselves in which we become 
mindful of ourselves; literature evokes in us, “you are that” (1992, p. 90). The point for 
both is that through the aesthetic medium we can recognize our authentic being in 
sympathy with the narratives and personifications of literature in ways that can be radically 
transformative. The conviction of critical perspectives on self-knowledge yields 
transformational growth.  
And the power of ideas heightened by a current of feeling and imagination can 
trigger new modes of understanding. In the sense of “a rising to a new life” (CPW V, p. 
183), the spirit of inquiry of the modern age can supply a new spiritual basis to life. Hadot 
concludes, ”Whoever concretely practices (these spiritual exercises) sees the universe with 
new eyes, as if he were seeing it for the first time. In the enjoyment of the pure present, he 
discovers the mystery and splendor of existence” (1995, p. 212). As we come to see 
ourselves as part of a larger human circle the growth of critical spirit liberates modern man 
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from totalizing forces in the material world in a move towards intellectual and moral 
autonomy. 
How the best literature inspires this transformative process in us as readers is a 
question that eschews explanation but aesthetic phenomenology and recent work in 




With his reader-response theory, Wolfgang Iser set literary theory in the direction 
of modern philosophical work in hermeneutics. In its light Arnold’s literary theory may be 
revitalized. Meaning as effect, Iser writes,  
is a perplexing phenomenon, and as such perplexity cannot be removed by 
explanations – on the contrary, it invalidates them. The effectiveness of the work 
depends on the participation of the reader, but explanations arise from (and also 
lead to) detachment; they will therefore dull the effect, for they relate the given text 
to a frame of reference, thus flattening out the new reality brought into being by the 
fictional text. In view of the irreconcilability of effect and explanation, the 
traditional expository style of interpretation has clearly had its day…. As meaning 
arises out of the process of actualization, the interpreter should perhaps pay more 
attention to the process than to the product. His object should therefore be, not to 
explain a work, but to reveal the conditions that bring about its various possible 
effects. (1978, p. 10 and p. 18) 
 
Certainly, Arnold would agree that the important part of literary interpretation is the 
process rather than the product. Implicit in his method of synthesis and exposition is the 
notion that there is already something existing as the special domain of artistic production 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See Singer (2003). Singer’s work emphasizes the coherence of modern aesthetics with the older Greek 
tradition of equating aesthetic judgment with protocols of human deliberation and rational action. It supports 
the proposition that there is continuity between aesthetic value and rational value, specifically as a means of 
rational self-reflection and ethical action. 
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which can be grasped through our involvement with literature. Distinct from a purely 
subjective experience, the act of reading in his view uncovers truth-value in art through 
“semblance of experience,” which we considered in the last chapter. A semblance may not 
be endowed with “meaning” in the sense Iser uses the term, but Arnold would argue that it 
has an objective quality to it which informs our experience of the aesthetic.  
Recall the dynamics of the elements, the conditions that constitute Arnold’s 
standard of literary excellence. The effects of charms or spells intimate secrets of human 
nature.18 Literary style, as he describes it, refines and elevates. Emotion, passion, or 
intensity attaches to fact in poetic simplicity, the distinctive characteristic of grand or 
classic literary style. Then captivating beauty, in accordance with nature, mediates sense 
perception as truth in semblance of experience, satisfying our instinct for beauty and our 
instinct for conduct. The description of this psychic movement echoes the play dynamic of 
Schiller’s aesthetic doctrine that asserts beauty consummates one’s humanity (1967, p. 
103).  
Reflecting on these literary techniques I am reminded of the story of Alcibiades’ 
encounter with Socrates when the young Athenian had reached an age that he thought 
readied him for public life. In a dialogue about knowing the self, Alcibiades is at first so 
bewildered by Socrates’ line of questioning that he begins to doubt that he can be sure of 
anything. Socrates has captured his attention. Alcibiades’ loss of sure footing is a gateway 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 There are obvious, notable similarities between Arnold’s description of the literary techniques that calls or 
compels the reader’s involvement and the “kitch” of commercial media that Arcilla claims has the effect of 
“extorting” the audience in mediumism. (2010, p. 71). The crucial difference as it pertains to the concerns 
here is in the response each evokes. In the case of the best literary examples, the natural curiosity of the 
reader is aroused, motivating an intentional engagement while the calculating media rapture that Arcilla 
militates against serves, as he argues, to distract our most human instincts, to merely entertain, and to enlist 
audiences in the ranks of consumers. An unwitting audience succumbs to the media as victims of beguiling 
commercial forces. 
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to refined thinking in partnership with his mentor. Then, as the two interlocutors settle into 
discovering what they may be sure about, pedagogy as practice begins. The dialogue can 
be seen to mirror the movement that Arnold emphasizes in his descriptions of the features 
of the best literature. An element of it is spellbinding, dislodging the reader from 
attachments to the as-is. The clarity of its poetic style elevates and excites her intellect and 
imagination, and the beauty of the artistic creation rewards her intuitions with the pleasures 
of new modes of knowing. Then the reader may glimpse the as-if, or possible, or not-yet. 
Thus begins the pedagogical literary practice in Arnold’s project for education. Literature 
assumes the role of mentor in his project for liberal education.  
Iser’s work demonstrates the author’s strong conviction concerning the dialogical 
nature of reading and its disruptive power. As communication, “it impinges upon the 
world, upon prevailing social structures, and upon existing literature.” And these 
“encroachments consist in the reorganization of those thought systems and social systems 
invoked by the repertoire of the text” (1978, p. ix). Gadamer places greater emphasis on 
the interpreter in the literary experience, which seems to more closely mirror Arnold’s 
thinking. The first condition of hermeneutics when something addresses us, Gadamer 
writes, “is the fundamental suspension of our prejudices. Such suspension of judgment and 
prejudice has the logical structure of a question. And the essence of the question is to open 
possibilities and keep them open” (2000, p. 299). Arnold’s notion of curiosity as “a high 
and fine quality of man’s nature, just this disinterested love of a free play of the mind on 
all subjects, for its own sake” (CPW III, p. 268), releases his inquirer to the same state of 
openness. How can this kind of heroic curiosity operate in a culture like our own which 
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insists that all knowledge be scientifically ordered, flattened as it is, by the limitations of 
certainty? Arnold’s response: “you must plunge yourself down to the depths of the sea of 
intuition; all other men are trying as far as in them lies to keep you at the barren surface” 
(Arnold, “Original manuscripts of unpublished poems, notes on lectures and other matter,” 
p. 14). His metaphor of plunging into a sea elicits the notion of abandoning the safety of 
what one thinks one knows and the familiar structure of knowledge. Then reading the best 
ideas can be understood as a liberating means to carry us farther into a vast sea of learning 
and unfamiliar currents of meaning where circles of knowledge connect in more than just 
rationally ordered ways.  
In Letter II of Letters from a Stoic (1969, pp. 33-34), the ancient Roman moralist 
Seneca offers related direction to his young student Lucilius in the practice of reading. 
Seneca encourages him to extend his stay among the best writers by reading and re-reading 
them to gain their intimate acquaintance. And he suggests after going over a lot of different 
thoughts, selecting one to be reflected upon thoroughly each day. Approaching it this way, 
reading becomes a focused and deeply personal process rather than merely entertaining, 
capricious encounters. With the intention of reading literature for intimate insights and 
intuitions this wisdom suggests we can expect to find deeper and wider currents of 
meaning and greater resonance in everyday life.  
 
Freedom to Think 
What conditions are necessary to plunge, freely, fully into a current of ideas? How 
can curiosity be fully exploited as criticism, as Arnold asserts it must, “to know the best … 
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irrespective of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and to value knowledge and 
thought as they approach this best without the intrusion of any other considerations 
whatever?” (CPW III, p. 268). The ultimate aim of Arnold’s culture as education is to 
liberalize individuals in society “by an ampler culture, admitted to a wider sphere of 
thought, living by larger ideas, with … provincialism dissipated, … intolerance cured, … 
pettiness purged” (CPW II, p. 322). Is this magical thinking? I think not if there is a 
commitment to a balanced and well-founded perspective concerning what constitutes 
genuine liberal education.  
 We have already recognized continuity in Arnold and Gadamer’s thinking. In other 
ways Gadamer seems to complete Arnold’s instincts about aesthetic education that would 
liberate the mind and spirit. They share the ideal of education that is built upon intellectual 
freedom to enter into “the infinite conversation concerning destiny, which we call 
philosophy” (Gadamer, 1992, p. 164). And in both accounts critical consciousness of 
oneself in the world as the true object of education depends on an ethos that privileges that 
conversation. In Gadamer’s essay, “The Ideal of the University” (1992), he warns that 
freedom which would permit a theoretical orientation in education must be considered a 
task and not just a privilege (p. 57). “Freedom will not be guaranteed us, if we do not know 
how to use the small space of freedom which has been left to us” (p. 52). The question of 
how to use that small space that is supposed to characterize liberal education returns us to 
Arnold’s teaching on the priority of literature to science in “Literature and Science.”  
Gadamer brings sobering amplification to Arnold’s concerns about the duality of 
science and literature with his twentieth century perspective on the dangerous distance we 
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live from ourselves, “which possess an eerie presence in the impulses of the human souls 
as, for example, the phenomenon of suicide shows, or is seen in the terrible legacy of war 
against one’s own kind not known anywhere else in nature” (1992, p. 55). In Arnold’s 
view, “*+,!-./,01!23!4+,!50,/,64!78,!./!624!.6!4+,!.64,6/.41!23!-,69/!/:33,0.68!!;!<:4!.6!
4+,.0!.6=757=.41!42!/:33,0>!,6?21>!3,,@!74!7@@>!A+2@@1!76B!50232:6B@1C!D“Original 
manuscripts of unpublished poems, notes on lectures and other matter,” p. 3). !Gadamer 
also emphasizes the precariousness of the relationship between the modern ideal of 
scientific method and the capacity to formulate an adequate world-view. A growing 
confidence in the manageability of all events in nature and human events, he warns, 
threatens to undermine human capacity to see things in radically novel ways. Instead both 
men valorize close reading in the humanities and the idea of “living with ideas” to 
appreciate man’s truer relationship to nature.  
Arnold and Gadamer call us to question whether our educational emphasis on 
science and technology derives from a distorted perspective of literature, which Arnold 
famously railed against in “Literature and Science.” Gadamer puts it another way: 
[T]he human sciences will remain undermined … if there should be no other 
rationality than that of the lawfulness of empirical facts.… The human way of life 
contains its own rationality, as do all creatures and structures which crystallize out 
of it and which we call culture. (1992, pp. 42-43) 
 
Their work suggests we seriously reconsider our perspective on literature and true science.  
 
Arnold, Contemporary, and Later Theorists 
Considering the legacy of Arnold’s literary perspective in relation to speculative 
philosophy brings us to another theoretical intersection. By the middle of the twentieth 
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century, philosophy, or at least philosophy in America, had reconciled the theoretical 
divide between science and ideas and adopted a generally unified view of Naturalism. One 
of its most illustrious and articulate spokesmen was John Dewey in whose shadow the 
work of innumerable scholars, including Arnold, who preceded him in the fields of 
philosophy, arts and aesthetics, and education recedes. But a closer look at the background 
to Naturalism brings the continuing relevancy of Arnold’s project for education into 
greater relief.  
Naturalism overcame a great many theoretical obstacles by its opposition to the 
duality of Nature and other realms of being – the empiricist antithesis of nature and 
experience; the idealist distinction between natural and transcendent; and the modern post-
Kantian dualism between nature and man (Randall, 1944, p. 357). But on a practical level 
those dualisms continue to disrupt a unified perspective. Science continues to operate over 
and against the natural forces it works to analyze and control. Religious fundamentalism 
stands in unrelenting opposition to any inclusive conception of naturalism and secular 
perspectives on the life of the spirit. The egoism of the self as world-creating remains a 
pervasive modern perspective. Largely missing in twentieth and twenty-first century 
progressive theory is the suggestion of practice that would attenuate fragmenting dualistic 
views. The aim of “Literature and Science” is to recommend a practice in education to 
restore a balanced view of man’s experience in the world and his position in nature, to 
know ourselves and the world. The means to this end, per Arnold, to know the best which 
has been thought and said in the world would lay a sufficiently broad and deep foundation 
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for that knowledge of ourselves and the world and that critical perspective on life which 
constitutes culture. Literature teaches us how to live.  
Arnold’s project for education is pragmatic: assimilate science to a practice of self-
cultivation and refocus the business of life from a narrow conception of work and material 
progress to the broadest conception of humanist ideals, which formal theory seemed to 
have accomplished with Naturalism. In vogue at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Naturalism restored man to his ancient Greek status within Nature. But by the middle of 
the last century, American naturalism – already fragmented as pragmatic, genetic and 
experimental naturalists, realistic, structural or logical naturalists, and poetic naturalists - 
had been put on the defensive against rival brands of specialized knowledge (Larrabee, 
1944, pp. 351-352). Arnold’s project shifts the activity of critical interpretation of man’s 
relation to Nature from philosophy to literature as pedagogical practice, a life-long 
commitment to reading, observing and reflecting upon the nature of existence. As Honan 
asserts, Arnold’s approach to all literature derives from a central doctrine of  “a work’s 
developing meaning” (1983, p. 361). True science, as Arnold conceives it, synthesizes the 
best ideas that prevail over time and come to us through written language and its meanings 
are subject to fresh interpretation as society evolves to enrich human progress. As Stone 
sees it,  
If a pragmatist may be defined as a pluralist with standards – someone who 
believes in subjecting the doctrines inherited from the past, and the unexamined 
presumptions of the present, to critical reflection; one whose aim is the 
improvement of the kingdom of this earth, bolstered by humanist ideals that 
promote social and individual transformation – then Arnold must be seen as an 
important precursor of pragmatism. (1997, p. 140)  
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Literature, in a perspective which pragmatist Richard Rorty has recently revitalized, is used 
to fill the void of metaphysical certainty (Stone, 1997, p. 159).  
Naturalistic philosophy worked to distinguish itself from older supernatural and 
anti-natural idealistic theories while holding onto its humanistic insights. In Dewey’s work 
there are echoes of Arnold’s faith in literature and imaginative reason, his democratic 
insight, and his profound respect for human social capacities. Dewey’s more systematic 
philosophy is the fruit of Arnold’s belief in the affinity of the aesthetic and the critical  
instincts of man and his unyielding optimism about prospects for the future of mankind.  
Reflecting on Arnold’s faith in literature as the realm in which mankind will find a 
surer and surer footing as time goes on, Dewey affirms the high calling of poetry. He 
elaborates Arnold’s conviction that poetry attaches emotion to an idea so that “the idea is 
the fact.” The imagination rests upon belief, Dewey says, here echoing Arnold’s “On the 
Modern Element:”  
Let the philosophy of a time be materialistic, mechanical, and the poetry of that 
time is artificial and unworthy. If the poet succeeds in rising above the thought that 
has taken possession of contemporary life, it is because by instinct or by desire he 
falls back on the larger and freer ideas of an earlier day. (2008, pp. 113-114)  
 
He asserts that Arnold’s faith in poetry is a reaction to the professional philosophy of his 
day that did not keep pace with the scientific ideas which so radically transformed the 
culture. He appreciates how poetry can supply a richer, more sympathetic voice to the 
message of science and report the truth in tones that resonate with the spirit of man. But 
unlike Arnold, who relies on literature, the aim of Dewey’s work is to find expression in 
philosophy that would bring man and man and man and nature into a broader and more 
intimate unity (2008, pp. 123-124).  
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George Santayana places Arnold in what he sees as the last generation of humanists 
whose thinking, he claims, was eclipsed by the fuller and freer inspiration embodied by the 
American humanists of recent centuries. The liminal point of the earlier humanist thought, 
defined by “the genteel tradition,” he suggests subjugates unbounded humanism to the 
need for conscience. “Kant and other German philosophers have actually reduced religion 
to false postulates or dramatic metaphors to the heroic practice of morality,” he claims. In 
this account, the Platonic/Christian tradition culminated in nineteenth century 
Romanticism. Arnold would not be as wholly sanguine about the prospects for the future 
of science as Santayana, who proclaimed, 
Society has gradually become a rather glorious, if troubled, organization of matter, 
and of man for material achievements. Even our greatest troubles, such as the late 
war, seem only to accelerate the scientific bridling of matter: troubles do not cease, 
but surgery and aviation make remarkable progress.… Spiritual distress, too, 
cannot be banished by spiritual anarchy … yet this spiritual distress may be 
disregarded, like bad dreams, so long as it remains isolated and does not organize 
any industrial revolt or any fresh total discouragement and mystic withdrawal, such 
as ushered in the triumph of Christianity. (2009, p. 560) 
 
Santayana attributes to Arnold the Romantic perspective of Christian thought which 
appeals to Supernaturalism. Arnold would deny this.  
Missing in Santayana’s understanding of Arnold is his conviction about unifying 
ideas in human nature, including those that bring man to see himself in others, and the 
notions of intellectual beauty and moral order as conceived in pre-Socratic Greek culture 
(CPW VII, p. 208).19 He regards the ancient moral order of righteousness that inspired 
Greek poetry conditioned by the nature and instincts of man. A closer reading of Arnold 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 This reference is from the collection of essays titled, God and the Bible, which is considered by many to 
represent some of Arnold’s best achievements. As R. H. Super reports on the jacket cover of this work, 
“Arnold defends his conceptions of Christianity – Christianity stripped of metaphysics and dogma, and 
morally based upon man’s experience with the need for goodness” (CPW VII). 
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would find him in substantial agreement with Santayana’s Naturalism, which asserts only 
one natural unit in morals: the individual man (2009, p. 571). Santayana writes about the 
“animal obstinacy” of all individuals as the backbone of all virtue, “though intelligence, 
convention, and sympathy may very much extend and soften its expression…. As the brute 
unconditionally wills to live, so the man, especially the strong masterful man, 
unconditionally wills to live after a certain fashion” (2009, p. 571). Likewise, Arnold 
insists that man’s “moral habit and rule evolved out of the instinct of self-preservation” 
and out of his instinct for reproduction (CPW VII, p. 225). That is, culture develops from 
practice that is found to be life-sustaining. “Unnatural” as they are to man in his 
rudimentary state, moral perceptions and moral practices endure in culture because they 
are life-sustaining he maintains. Moral intuitions constitute the “God of Experience,” 
Arnold argues. Thus, morality is touched with emotion and made more powerful by it as 
with his example of the commandment to honor thy father and mother, 
When Israel fixed the feeling of a child’s natural attachment to its parents by the 
commandment: Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the 
land which the Eternal thy God giveth thee, he showed that he had risen to regard 
this feeling, - slowly and precariously acquired though by our supposition it may 
have been, - as sure, solid, and sacred part of the constitution of human nature. 
(CPW VII, p. 225)  
 
 Whether people believe that it comes from a “magnified and non-natural man in the 
clouds” or from man’s intuition, its powers are undiminished. Arnold’s conception of “The 
God of Experience,” (CPW VII, pp. 203-236) parallels Santayana’s insistence on  seeing 
the moral origins and the limits of the moral sphere, removing supernatural obstacles to the 
purity of moral feeling (2009, p. 570). The supposition for both is of moral habit and rule 
that evolves from natural instinct.  
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 Santayana’s thinking on the most important matters upon which Arnold bases his 
call to culture is entirely consistent with Arnold’s, and explicitly extends the idea of 
plurality.  
A reasonable physician of the soul would leave his patients to prescribe for 
themselves, though not before subjecting them to a Socratic or even Freudian 
inquisition, or searching of heart, in order to awaken in them a radical self-
knowledge, such as amid conventions and verbal illusions they probably do not 
possess. Evidently a regimen determined in this way has no validity for any other 
being, save in the measure in which it, as a matter of fact, that other being partakes 
in the same nature and would find his sincere happiness in the same things. This is 
seldom or never exactly the case. Nothing is more multiform than perfection. No 
interest, no harmony, shuts out the legitimacy or the beauty of any other.… [F]rom 
nature, in her indefinite plasticity, nothing is shut out a priori.… Perfection is the 
most natural form of existence, simply carrying out the organic impulse by which 
any living creature arises at all; nor can that impulse ever find its quietus and 
satisfaction short of perfection. (2009, p. 572) 
 
As Arnold observes, the perfection of the self finds unity in general perfection. Santayana 
also finds that in the mindful person passions acquire a sense of responsibility to one 
another (2009, p. 573). Thus the intellectual path of philosophical naturalism can be seen 
to parallel Arnold’s aesthetic ideals pushing against a materialist, reductive view of life in 




In the work considered here, Arnold demonstrates the value of ancient wisdom to 
modern day problems. Responding to the degradation of life in a world which Taylor 
(2007) describes as plagued by the malaise of immanence, he refreshes timeless good sense 
with the idea of a practice that would raise our consciousness and interpret life through a 
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critical spirit. With literature as mentor he recommends turning inward to recover moral 
capacities for unity with nature and the human community. His claims on the value of the 
aesthetic experience that more than reason alone can instruct us in how to judge a good life 
anticipate modern hermeneutic theory. Moral interpretation of life through literature will 
bring us to new modes of understanding and reveal connections that undermine what 
reason alone may deny. Then a law of ultimate fusion can restore a more satisfying 
equipoise in the life of the individual and in the collective life of society.  
Arnold asks us to trust the moral authority of aesthetic judgment that can fill the 
void of religion and philosophy and rescue the millions who long for escape from the 
darkling plain. He makes obvious the reasons to seriously consider a radical shift in 
emphasis that would subjugate the intense focus on scientific knowledge to humanist 
ideals. He brings to educational theory what Nietzsche faults the ancient Greeks for 
missing: the priority of art and literature to science and technology. His view that reading 
literature as a natural practice unveils a deeper and wider nexus of reality which human 
nature shares with the physical world is a premise for fundamental educational reform. His 
work makes a convincing case for closer scrutiny of new theories in aesthetic phenomena 
to consider that art can reveal unity and continuity as much in matters of neuroscience and 
quantum physics as in human existence. It suggests that a truer relation of literature to 


















Conclusion: the Direction of Literature in Academia 
 
When we remember that our aim is spiritual progress, we return to 




I have tried to amplify direct quotes from Arnold and his contemporaries and 
nineteenth century rhetoric and to reinvigorate the meaning of many of the terms he uses to 
signify key themes in his work.  Already challenged in his own time when critics would 
exclusively equate culture with highbrow Belle Lettres or ancient Greek and Latin, 
“culture” has devolved into a nearly meaningless word today. With the epistemological 
change in the use of the term comes a conceptual loss for Arnold’s project. Instead of 
culture standing for a unifying concept, it has become fragmented in its different uses and 
interpretations among a variety of notions of multiculturalism, pluralism and native culture 
and the ideas that those terms engender concerning inclusion and exclusion. The activism 
of Arnold’s idea of culture seems farther removed from its common usage today. The 
apparent lack of meaning, Jacoby (1999) asserts, signals an intellectual retreat. 
The economic structure of society – call it advanced industrial society or capitalism 
or market economy – stands as the invariant; few can imagine a different economic 
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project. The silent agreement says much about multiculturalism. No divergent 
political or economic vision animates cultural diversity. From the most militant 
Afrocentrists to the most ardent feminists, all quarters subscribe to very similar 
beliefs about work, equality and success. The secret of cultural diversity is its 
political and economic uniformity. The future looks like the present with more 
options. Multiculturalism spells the demise of utopia. (p. 40)  
 
The “bedrock principle” of pluralism has become “the ideology of the market and the 
individual” (Jacoby, 1999, p. 47) and its elevation in cultural discourse obscures a more 
penetrating cultural criticism. Without excavating deeper currents of influence in the 
origins of our capitalist structure, any idea of a more substantive egalitarian impulse is 
submerged in the rhetoric of new cultural criticism. The tyranny of the Puritan work and 
wealth fetish remains unchallenged. At the same time, the new economic metrics of 
rational choice theory, in common and increasing use, insult the humanity of our 
population. Economic market forces shape how we as a nation, and as a global influence, 
measure and compare “quality of life.” As Nussbaum (1995) asserts in Poetic Justice: The 
Literary Imagination and Public Life, which I consider in more detail below, these forces 
threaten the hope of human solidarity and a more humane construal of the world.  
Jacoby (1999) tracks the demise of utopian ideals through an intellectual history of 
modern ideology that appears to have taken a society, already spiritually unmoored, even 
further out to sea. He champions the boldness of liberal thinkers like Arnold and decries 
the loss of true egalitarian ideals when culture critics embraced “mass culture as complex 
terrains of subversion and contestation” (p. 69). He continues,  
That people are equal and should be treated equally is one matter; that their 
thoughts and activities are equal is another. The second does not follow from the 
first or, at least, it does not directly follow; it must first pass through history and 
society. This means that the principle of human equality and its concrete expression 
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in society are not the same. By virtue of inferior education or destructive condition, 
equal people develop unequally. (p. 69) 
 
An uncritical acceptance of the fundamental status quo forfeits any imperative to seek the 
kind of radical disruption of injustice in the system, which Arnold’s concept of culture 
embodies. Conservatives, who understand the fundamental shift we are called to consider 
by his idea of culture, blanch at his writing. On the other side, by associating Arnold with 
conservative nineteenth century elitism, modern liberals dismiss him as anachronistic. As 
he reflected upon his own legacy in later life, he admits to having become a,  
nearly worn-out man-of-letters, with one nostrum for practical application, his 
nostrum for public schools for the middle classes; and with a frippery of phrases 
about sweetness and light; seeing things as they really are, knowing the best that 
has been thought and said in the world, which never had very much solid meaning, 
and have now quite lost the gloss and charm of novelty. (CPW X, p. 74) 
 
Jacoby insists that if we cast Arnold aside, we cast aside the promise of seeing a better 
future. “The point is: Arnold did not defend ‘sweetness and light’ as abstract goods; he 
defended a bountiful world against a cramped life of money and work” (1999, p. 96).  
 Recent work that examines the status of literary studies in today’s colleges and 
universities suggests that his ideas have not been permanently eclipsed either by more 
recent relativistic cultural criticism or a less enlightened perspective of human flourishing. 
His work resonates with a variety of critical perspectives on the place of literature among 
the growing spectrum of academic specializations that currently exists in American 






Nussbaum makes two claims in Poetic Justice that suggest the relevance of 
literature as pedagogy: first, that reading literature provides insights that can play a role in 
the construction of an adequate moral and political theory; and second, that it develops 
moral capacities (1995, p. 12). She brings these insights to inform the education of lawyers 
and judges (in a course she teaches at the University of Chicago called “Law and 
Literature”#E) and, hopefully, to provide a counterweight to prevailing models of utilitarian 
rational choice. Her goal is to have what she calls the “literary imagination” recognized as 
a part of public rationality.  
Nussbaum targets the normative economics of social science - rational choice 
theory - that operates in public policy-making, sociology, political science, welfare and 
development economics, and the law. She wants to make room for a more moral and less 
utilitarian picture of human beings and human rationality. The science is based on four 
assumptions: commensurability, aggregation, maximizing, and exogenous preferences. 
Most contemporary models of rational choice theory deem all value factors as measurable 
on a single scale that exhibits differences only of quantity, i.e., lacking any regard for 
quality. All things are thus commensurate with one another; no single option is essentially 
better than any other that one might choose. Pooling all the data on and about individual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Nussbaum (1995) describes the course: “The law students and I read Sophocles, and Plato, and Seneca, and 
Dickens. In connection with the literary works, we discuss compassion and mercy, the role of the emotions in 
public judgment, what is involved in imagining the situation of someone different from oneself. We talked 
about ways in which texts of different types present human beings – seeing them, in some cases, as ends in 
themselves, endowed with dignity and individuality, in others as abstract undistinguishable units or as mere 
means to the ends of others. Since the University of Chicago Law School is the birthplace of the law-and-
economics movement, we discussed the relationship between the literary imagination and economic 
reasoning” (xiv).  
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lives without regard for differences produces a social measure by aggregation. The idea of 
maximizing ignores what is aimed at (for example, wealth, power, satisfaction, or pleasure) 
and calculates individual and social rationality only as aimed at getting as large an amount 
of something as possible. Lastly, individual preferences are assumed to be exogenous. 
Utilitarian rational choice theorists claim to be able to predict behavior on the presumption 
that the end of individual choice is always the maximization of satisfaction of individual 
self-interest. A more extreme version of rational choice theory maintains that “all of man’s 
deliberative, forward-looking behavior follows the principles of economics” (as cited in 
Nussbaum, 1995, p. 47). Public policy makers in decision-making increasingly use the 
science of utilitarian rational choice. Arnold could hardly have imagined a more 
mechanistic perspective to inform how we regard the life choices of human beings.  
Based on her commitment to the idea that storytelling and literary imagining can 
provide essential ingredients in rational argument, Nussbaum reads Dickens’s Hard Times, 
a satire on perfect scientific rationality to infiltrate the purely economic perspective of her 
law students. (Recall Trilling’s description in Chapter Two of the coercive social and 
economic forces and society’s acquiescence to them that was a popular topic of literary 
figures of Arnold’s time and the theme of Dickens’s satire). The story’s main character, 
Mr. Gradgrind, economist, public man, and educator is right, she says,  
Literature and the literary imagination are subversive. We are accustomed by now 
to think of literature as optional: as great, valuable, entertaining, excellent, but 
something that exists off to one side of political and economic and legal thought, in 
another university department, ancillary rather than competitive. The segmentation 
of the modern academy – along with narrowly hedonistic theories of literary value 
– has caused us to lose hold of the insight that Mr. Gradgrind securely grasped: that 
the novel is a morally controversial form, expressing in its very shape and style, in 
its modes of interaction with its readers, a normative sense of life. It tells its readers 
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to notice this and not this, to be active in these and not those ways. It leads them 
into certain postures of the mind and heart and not others. And as Mr. Gradgrind all 
too clearly perceived, these are the wrong way, and highly dangerous postures, 
from the point of view of the narrow conception of economic rationality that is, in 
his view, normative for both public and private thought, (1995, p. 2) 
 
Nussbaum argues not only that literature illuminates the personal life and private 
imagination but also that literary forms have a unique contribution to make when larger 
social and political concerns are at issue. She shares the perspective of literature as 
dialogical with Arnold, Iser, and Gadamer and introduces it to new pedagogical territory in 
a school of law.  
Good literature is disturbing in a way that history and social science writing 
frequently are not. Because it summons powerful emotions, it disconcerts and 
puzzles. It inspires distrust of conventional pieties and exacts a frequently painful 
confrontation with one’s own thoughts and intentions. One may be told many 
things about people in one’s own society and yet keep that knowledge at a distance. 
Literary works that promote identification and emotional reaction cut through those 
self-protective stratagems, requiring us to see and to respond to many things that 
may be difficult to confront – and they make this process palatable by giving us 
pleasure in the very act of confrontation. (Nussbaum, 1995, pp. 5-6) 
 
In the telling of a story, she reasons that the novel involves its readers with the personages 
and the perplexities of their lives. By association with their possibilities for existence and 
choice that “are in certain respects (the reader’s) own to seize, though concrete 
circumstances may differ greatly,” their interpretation is both moral and critical. In the 
imaginary life of the novel, things that do not really exist help readers acknowledge their 
own world and “choose more reflectively in it” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 31).  
The wisdom and sympathetic experience of the aesthetic engagement that one may 
come to appreciate in a course such as this may remediate a law student’s moral 
perspective and bring about a more generous outlook on the world. But to habituate an 
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inward turning, moral eye adequate to the intellectual deliverance that Arnold preaches 
would require far greater institutional commitment. The hope in Nussbaum’s project is that 
the message is trumpeted at the university and through the professional network to focus 
attention on more radical reform.  
 
The Power for Good  
Reviewing Culture and Anarchy for a new edition of the original text of 1869, 
Steve Marcus (1994) considers whether Arnold’s educational principles may just be 
obsolete.  
The question is how does one make a claim for standards of excellence and 
judgments or differential quality in a social and cultural world that is 
epistemologically unmoored, socially and ethnically diverse, temperamentally 
relativistic and that is, moreover, driven in the main by the politics of identity, 
group thought, and the hegemony of representativeness? The major presuppositions 
of this world – especially as they obtain in contemporary American schools and 
universities – is that there are no plausible, convincing, or intersubjective standards 
to which anyone can appeal in the effort to establish judgments of quality. (p. 184) 
 
Arnold insists that lights brighter than reason alone must guide us forward. Marcus 
interprets Arnold correctly when he observes that reform will come about only by way of 
indirect means precisely because culture rejects machinery and politics as ends. Reform 
depends on a prioritization in education of an “inward working” culture as the means by 
which larger aims will be brought closer to us (p. 170). He interprets Arnold’s message in 
Culture and Anarchy in language that speaks to Nussbaum’s Law and Literature:  
Culture seeks to humanize knowledge – that is, to make it general and 
nonprofessional and nonexclusive – to make it available without condescension to 
everyone. And the means of doing so are to be found in education, not politics …. 
What is needed, (Arnold agues with conviction), is ‘a principle of authority,’ that is 
to say, some idea or entity that can stand for right reason, for judgments of value, 
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for judgments that take precedence over the interest-begotten prejudices of class or 
group – judgments that today we would call something like regulative norms. 
(Marcus, 1994, p. 175 and pp. 177-178)  
 
His argument stands precariously against concerns about teaching any cultural tradition in 
modernity: that notions such as truth or knowledge and distinctions of epistemological or 
aesthetic merit are discredited as elements of systems of social control and cultural 
oppression. While his reflections on this text cause us to seriously question the 
“effectiveness and powers for good” of educational institutions, Marcus concludes with a 
mixture of omen and hope recommending the radical Arnoldian ideal of “what may be 
thinkable if not possible for modern humanity” (p.183).  He continues: 
To lose belief in education, to cease to hope that education is the means to light, 
would be to admit that the cause of light is itself lost. I do not think that we are 
ready yet to break the connection between our historical past and the perennially 
embattled present. And as long as we have not severed that connection, Culture and 
Anarchy will remain as one of the sources to which we resort with the prospect of 
finding strength to continue, reserves of argument, phrases and language to shore 
up our spirits, and courage to face the darker prospects of our later, indeed perhaps 






In the same new edition of Culture and Anarchy, Graff (1994) focuses on the issue 
of a common culture that is responsible for Arnold’s regular invocation in the much-
ballyhooed debates in the culture wars. Newer conceptions of pluralism and 
multiculturalism have common culture proponents on the defensive today, precisely where 
Graff intends to keep them. While acknowledging that “unchecked critical rationality … 
can lead to relativism, nihilism and the dissolution of traditional certainties” (p. 187), Graff 
challenges the notion of universality championed by conservatives with whom, as I argue 
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in Chapter Three, he mistakenly associates Arnold. Regrettably Graff’s read of Arnold 
obscures a broader interpretation of ‘culture’ and the clear perspective of the individual as 
the proper object of education. Thus in his institutional history of literary studies, 
Professing Literature (2007), Arnold’s view of literature fails to effectively inform Graff’s 
proposals for change in how we profess literature.!Graff’s cogent and sometimes amusing 
analysis argues for a new direction for literature in academia today that could benefit from 
a more developed understanding of Arnoldian ideals.  
  Graff asserts a lost pedagogical potential inherent in controversies regarding how to 
teach literature and why, which have long engaged the faculties of literary studies and 
university administrations but have largely remained hidden from students’ experience of 
literature. He is right in concluding that reading literary works without appreciating these 
controversies seriously diminishes the intellectual coherence of the academic experience.  
Graff’s research began with an assumption that there was an original shared 
agreement about the social value of a literary tradition that has been lost over time, amidst 
academic turf wars and newer critical theories of literature. As is often the case, 
discussions on these matters evoke the concept of humanism Matthew Arnold espoused. 
But as Graff explains, despite vague assumptions of some tacit belief in a guiding humanist 
hand that pervades literature departments, which he dubs “The Humanist Myth,” more 
recent concepts of literature and literary scholarship have eclipsed Arnoldian humanism 
and consequently, controversy abounds.  
 Graff points to the failure of Arnoldian humanist conceptions of tradition and 
values to provide an effective academic umbrella to reconcile newer literary studies in 
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synergistic relationship to each other. Instead, competing views of literature, scholarship, 
and culture have divided literature departments along the lines of theorists and humanists, 
and foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. The initial crux of the great divide, he 
shows, was the institutionalization of “philological and historical literary scholarship that 
… qualified literary studies for departmental status in the new research university” (2007, 
p. 3). The continuing trend of departmental specialization now undermines Arnold’s ideal 
of literature as a coherent criticism of life. And as long as the turf wars continue within 
literature departments, no unified model for literary studies stands for Literature in relation 
to other university programs and the general curriculum.  
Returning to Arnold can be a productive starting point for discussions about 
mending academic divides and bringing the wisdom of competing interests into greater and 
more productive congruence. In the light of newer scholarship his teaching on “true 
science” suggests progressive interdisciplinary possibilities which I consider below. As 
Graff suggests, there is great pedagogical value to exposing the controversies. But his 
answer to the turf wars is to push literature to evolve into another new form of literary 
theory that ends at uncovering the ideological assumptions upon which the controversies 
arose. He overlooks another, more productive alternative: reconsider reading literature as a 
practice of self-cultivation. Drawing back the curtain on all the controversy, students may 
more fully consider the place of literature in the tradition of philosophy as a way of life by 
reading the “best” work together. Discussing it in that context can introduce the real 
possibility of experiencing profoundly more animating potentials in literature.  
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As part of a teach-the-controversy reform, a rehabilitated Arnoldian point of view 
on literature can expand the insights of good scholarship that reside amid the controversy 
on the concept of general education, such as Hutchins’ recommendations in 1936, which 
call for  
a course of study consisting of the greatest books of the western world and the arts 
of reading, writing, thinking and speaking, together with mathematics, the best 
exemplar of the processes of human reason. The idea was ‘to frame a curriculum 
which educes the elements of our common human nature,’ which would teach 
‘what has been done in the past, and what the greatest men have thought.’ (as cited 
in Graff, 2007, p. 164) 
 
Pursuing the controversies pedagogically would lead to critical responses to that 
traditionalist view of general education.  Does Hutchins’ view surrender to social pressures 
of vocationalism and material interest if they withdraw in aloofness from the social affairs 
of the time? (Graff, 2007, p. 166).  Graff’s interpretation of the contemporary reception to 
the early proponents of general education rests on Dewey’s insights but would expand with 
Arnoldian ideals.  
To divorce education from the immediate vocational world … was merely to leave 
the world of business and power to flourish unexamined. Dewey … wondered why 
‘the facts stated about the evil effects of our love of money’ should not legitimately 
invite attention from ‘institutions devoted to love of truth for its own sake,’ 
attention, that is, ‘to the economic institutions that have produced this overweening 
love, and to their social consequences in other matters than the temper of 
educational institutions; and attention to the means available for changing this state 
of things’ (as cited in Graff, 2007, p. 166)  
 
Arnold’s opposition to insularity is instructive. “To know how others stand, that we may 
know how we ourselves stand”(CPW I, p. 21) offers a penetrating modern perspective. 
And the problem, “to know how we ourselves stand, that we may correct our mistakes,” 
suggests that exclusively outward turning education is part of the controversy. It beckons a 
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clear focus on the true object and purpose of education and the vision to see existing 
conditions in a new light.  
Reconsidering the idea that literature teaches us how to live offers no panacea to 
the institutional fragmentation brought about by “professionalization” and 
“academicization” that Graff reports. His work reveals that coherence is as absent in the 
curriculum as it is in the culture. But if there is progress to be made in the restoration of 
unity it may achieved by drawing the community of educators together to seriously inquire 
into Arnold’s dictum of literature as criticism of life.  
 
Interdisciplinarity 
In The Marketplace of Ideas, Louis Menand (2010) also reflects on the current state 
of affairs in the American university. He suggests that we have lost our way within a 
system that is caught in an obsolete mind-set. While he disputes Graff’s teach-the-
controversy resolution to the problem of conflicting approaches to inquiry in literature and 
the humanities, his answer is to get on with education without a consensus paradigm for 
the humanities. He commends the leadership of the humanities in awakening the rest of the 
academic world to issues surrounding objectivity, interpretation, and the significance of 
cultural differences. And he is not uncomfortable leaving eclecticism to define humanist 
studies.  
Most of the shocks to the philosophical foundations of teaching and scholarship in 
the humanities, from the interpretive turn in the sixties and seventies to the 
diversity turn in the eighties and nineties, arose from challenges to prevailing 
understandings of what counts. Legitimacy – is this really knowledge or is it 
something else? – was precisely what was at stake in (the institutional equivalent of 
a revolution that the humanities experienced between 1970 and 1980). It is 
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probably impossible, after the revolution, to put the toothpaste back in the tube. 
Eclecticism seems to be the fate of the academic humanities. But there is no reason 
why that cannot in itself constitute a claim to legitimacy. (p., 92)  
 
Menand’s work argues for less formal disciplinarity; and he should be commended for his 
broad insights on the problems that specialization and professionalization bring to 
education. However since his analysis makes little substantive distinction between 
humanities programs and any other non-professional program, it overlooks the potential 
for remedy inherent in the humanities.  
To allow eclecticism to define the mission of studies in humanities may be simply 
too easy an answer to the problem. It precludes the opportunity to introduce real coherence 
to the students’ academic experience and real coherence among the variety of objects of 
study and methods of inquiry associated with the liberal arts and sciences. And while there 
can be no triumphant, all-inclusive concept of knowledge, Arnold’s argument for the value 
of a unifying premise that connects all knowledge is important to consider. To settle for 
eclecticism implies an alignment between relativism and the idea of truth. It breeds 
competition and opposition among the sub-disciplines and thus produces fragmented, 
competing perspectives on the question of legitimacy of knowledge.  
 Menand’s research also observes a general fragility in the constitution of 
humanities programs in academia today that stems from a utilitarian perspective among 
academic stakeholders looking for return on investment which more professional studies 
have little difficulty in demonstrating. “There was anxiety that behind the problem of 
public justification was another problem, … there was no clear agreement of a definition of 
what humanists do” (2010, p. 63). His point in Marketplace is that a divorce between 
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liberalism and professionalism as educational missions rests on a superstition: that the 
practical is the enemy of the true (p. 57).  
Menand would like to change the way producers of knowledge (professors) are 
produced and make academic inquiry more porous and holistic (p. 158). His historical 
analysis underscores the evolution (and legitimacy and professionalization) of literary 
criticism as a form of knowledge in its own right, as “a discovery about the nature of 
literature or of literary language.” But these developments overlook the origins of literary 
criticism and its conception in ancient tradition that could be useful to his ideas of reform.  
He describes the rationale to which literary criticism is subjected by the professionalization 
of literary studies. 
To the extent that literary criticism is thought of as the possibly idiosyncratic 
interpretation and appreciation of works of literature and the drawing of moral and 
other non-aesthetic conclusions from those activities, the university literature 
department is not especially well suited to the business of producing either 
interesting literary criticism or interesting literary critics. But to the degree that 
literary criticism is thought of as a discovery about the nature of literature or of 
literary language by the application of philosophically grounded methods of 
inquiry, then the modern academy becomes a relatively congenial place in which to 
practice criticism. (p. 110)  
  
Menand looks at how universities have gotten into the business of credentialing 
professionals whose success is measured in journal articles produced to fill the marketplace 
of ideas. If colleges and universities were only knowledge factories, there should be no 
objection to what his analysis exposes. But when the current of professionalization 
subordinates the study of literature that animates moral consciousness, that shift 
undermines the idea that academia is more than a set of knowledge factories. The 
professionalization of literary studies develops at the expense of the liberal value of 
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literature for human flourishing. His work highlights examples of successful research from 
collaborative efforts between disciplines that creates new bodies of knowledge. These are 
indicative of the potential of interdisciplinarity and “true science.” 
The most important intellectual development in the academy in the twenty-first 
century has to do with the relationship between the life sciences – particularly 
neurobiology, genetics, and psychology – to fields outside the natural sciences, 
such as philosophy, economics, and literary studies. So far, contention and 
collaboration in this area seem robust. The system is doing what it was designed to 
do. It is helping people think better by helping them think together. (p. 19) 
 
The familiar echo of Menand’s answer to what liberal studies depend on indicates the road 
reform should take: “the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, without regard to political, 
economic, or practical benefit” (p. 55).  The promise of interdisciplinarity, he believes, 
will “smooth out the differences between the empirical and the hermeneutic, the hard and 
the soft, disciplines” (p. 118).  
 
A Better Future 
 To the extent that students of Arnold see a utopian vision in his project for 
education, Jacoby amplifies the urgency of Arnold’s call to culture to restrain the human 
degradation perpetrated by market forces. His views on the ways that the modern notion of 
culture subsumes economic and political visions, and defeats utopian ideals are 
compelling. He asserts that an elastic notion of culture that initially undermined prejudice 
and ethnocentrism now obscures profoundly deeper forces of social and economic reality 
and its meaningful imperatives. Diverse cultures rest on the same unexamined 
infrastructures, he argues, but this does not enter the discourse on pluralism and equal 
opportunity. Jacoby regards this as an impoverished picture of culture. In its disregard for 
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the totalizing effects of market forces it is a threat to the progress of civilization.  Arnold 
made the point in Culture and Anarchy. 
Culture begets a dissatisfaction which is of the highest possible value in stemming 
the common tide of men’s thoughts in a wealthy and industrial community, and 
which saves the future, as one may hope, from being vulgarized, even if it cannot 
save the present. (CPW V, p. 98) 
 
Marcus (1994) emphasizes the urgency of Arnold’s message for us today. Even radical 
opposition to the monopoly of official public discourse, he says, “seems to be fatally 
infected by [its totalizing force] and so speaks in virtually the same shamefully uncritical 
terms about power and wealth, as if these necessary means were somehow magical, self-
justifying, and absolute ends in themselves” (p. 173).  
 Jacoby has faith in Arnold’s project to excavate the infrastructure with a critique of 
mass culture that can reignite a utopian impulse.  
Arnold serves as a symbol in the culture wars, but he deserves better; he offered an 
approach to mass culture that should be resuscitated. Along with John Stuart Mill 
and Alexis de Tocqueville, Arnold endorsed democracy and equality. At the same 
time the great nineteenth-century liberal thinkers did not fetishize these categories; 
they remained alert to outcomes and contexts, assailing “leveling,” the “tyranny of 
the majority” or “uniformity.” They understood that supporting equality and 
democracy did not entail approving all its configurations. On the contrary, they 
often protested what in today’s idiom might be called mass culture. They were 
democrats and egalitarians willing to criticize everyday culture and opinions no 
matter how entrenched or popular. (Jacoby, 1999, 68)  
 
As I have been writing this, historic democratic revolutions are taking place in the 
Middle East. People who have never had a say in how they should be governed or what 
constitutes justice have become newly enfranchised in self-government. How those 
populations form a conception of the good, and the meaning and purpose of life will have 
everything to do with free, available democratic education. But already at work in those 
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fledgling democracies is the silent hand of capitalism and the forces of market 
manipulation which, if not exposed, can sublimate democracy’s ideal to narrow utilitarian 
aims. One can only hope that the egalitarian and democratic thrust of Arnoldian themes 
enlighten a philosophy of education aimed at true equality, self knowledge and critical 
moral consciousness as the bedrock for increasing the general standard of human welfare 
and the prospects of world peace. 
Closer to home, the corruption of misguided capitalism has created an historic gulf 
between an elite, wealthy few and the rest of society that defies the principles of equality 
upon which our Western democracies were founded. What is as disconcerting as the 
problem is the apparent apathy of the general public which I interpret as symptomatic of a 























As Pratt maintains, Arnold’s idea of culture “is intended to displace what he sees 
emerging as a self-righteous but narrow-minded materialist national culture” (2000, p. 5). 
Prophetic in his own time, Arnold’s ideas have never been more relevant nor the need for 
culture more urgent. Arnold’s literary criticism responds to the question of what literature 
can do for the individual and society. Literature as pedagogy can reanimate the spiritual 
life of society. By its capacity to edify, it can defeat the miscarriage of nihilism and carry 
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